

Barbara U. Rodriguez-Pashkowski (No. 006958)  
E-mail: [bpashkowski@gustlaw.com](mailto:bpashkowski@gustlaw.com)  
**GUST ROSENFELD P.L.C.**  
One E. Washington, Suite 1600  
Phoenix, AZ 85004  
Telephone: 602-257-7422  
*Attorneys for The Town of Florence*

Ronnie P. Hawks (No. 019122)  
E-mail: [RPH@JHC.Law](mailto:RPH@JHC.Law)  
James L. Csontos (No. 010823)  
E-mail: [JLC@JHC.Law](mailto:JLC@JHC.Law)  
**JENNINGS, HAUG & CUNNINGHAM, L.L.P.**  
2800 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1800  
Phoenix, AZ 85004-1049  
Telephone: 602-234-7800  
Facsimile: 602-277-5595  
Court Documents: [docket@JHC.Law](mailto:docket@JHC.Law)  
*Attorneys for SWVP-GTIS MR, LLC*

D. Christopher Ward (No. 007523)  
E-mail: [Christopher.Ward@pultegroup.com](mailto:Christopher.Ward@pultegroup.com)  
**PULTE HOME COMPANY, L.L.C.**  
16767 N. Perimeter Drive, Suite 100  
Scottsdale, AZ 85260  
Telephone: 480-391-6157  
*Attorney for Pulte Home Company, LLC*

## SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA

### MARICOPA COUNTY

THE TOWN OF FLORENCE, a  
political subdivision of the State of  
Arizona; SWVP-GTIS MR, LLC, a  
Delaware limited liability company;  
and PULTE HOME COMPANY,  
LLC, a Michigan limited liability  
company,

Appellants,

vs.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF  
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, et  
al.,

Appellees.

Case No.: LC2017-000466-001 DT

**APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF**

(Assigned to the Hon. Patricia Starr)

Oral Argument Requested

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Appellants and the residents, businesses and visitors of the Town of Florence depend upon groundwater for current and future drinking water supplies. Florence Copper, Inc. (FCI) proposes to recover copper from a deposit on a State Land parcel in the heart of Town that is exempt from the Town's zoning and planning restrictions. FCI will use an untested method of sulfuric acid injection and extraction in a location hydrologically connected to the Town's water supply.

In 2013, the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) issued a Temporary Aquifer Protection Permit ("Temporary APP") to FCI to operate a pilot test facility ("PTF") intended to develop data for commercial permits and operations. The Temporary APP issued by ADEQ failed to provide adequate environmental protection. After an eight-week evidentiary hearing in 2014, a detailed report from an Administrative Law Judge found numerous fatal flaws in the permit involving both legal and technical issues. The Water Quality Appeals Board (Board) accepted all but one of the ALJ's findings and remanded the permit back to ADEQ.

In 2016, following a flawed public review process, ADEQ issued a new permit that directly defies the 2014 decision. This permit approves a Pollution Management Area (PMA) that extends even farther from the PTF than the one ruled unreasonably large and illegal in 2014. And ADEQ approved the same Point of Compliance (POCs) locations that were ruled too far from the PTF and thus illegal in 2014. The permitted PMA and POCs contain such lax compliance standards that FCI will be immune to enforcement for causing groundwater pollution, even pollution resulting from total project failure. The Board approved ADEQ's decision without change, ignoring its own prior 2014 Decision and



1 significant technical and legal flaws in the amended permit that the Board, itself,  
2 had previously determined precluded approval of the Temporary APP.

3 Appellants ask the Court to remand the permit back to ADEQ with  
4 direction to conform the PMA and POCs to Arizona law and the Board's 2014  
5 binding decision, thereby providing the environmental protection that the law  
6 requires and the public expects.

## 7 **II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE<sup>1</sup>**

8 1. In March 2012, FCI applied for a Temporary APP for an in-situ leach  
9 pilot test facility on state trust land leased by FCI.<sup>2</sup> During the pilot test, FCI  
10 intends to leach copper from bedrock under its site through injection of a sulfuric  
11 acid solution into an ore body that is in direct hydraulic communication with the  
12 primary drinking water aquifer for the Town of Florence. The pilot test is  
13 intended to answer critical questions about the environmental safety and  
14 viability of the in-situ leach injection process in anticipation of FCI's application  
15  
16

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17 <sup>1</sup> The Record on Appeal consists of the 91 PDF documents and items Nos. 92-96 (native  
18 format Word, PowerPoint and video) provided to the Court with the June 20, 2018  
19 Stipulation and listed in Exhibit 2, thereto. The PDF documents listed as items 1-92 are  
20 Bates' numbered within the range RA000001-RA007948. In this Brief, a reference to one  
of the 96 items included in the Record on Appeal will be, for example, "**Record-43**" as  
a reference to item 43 in the Record on Appeal, the February 2, 2017 Notice of Hearing,  
Bates Nos. RA006919-RA006921.

21 <sup>2</sup> **Record-69**, *Town of Florence v. ADEQ*, Case No. 16-002-WQAB, Order at 1, Finding of  
22 Fact ("FOF") 1 (May 17, 2017) ("2017 Board Order") (RA007462); **Record-2**, *Town of*  
23 *Florence v. ADEQ*, OAH No. 12-005-WQAB, Administrative Law Judge Decision, at 2-3,  
24 FOF 1 (September 29, 2014) (RA001784-85) (hereinafter "2014 Decision"). The 2014  
25 Decision was adopted by the Board in **Record-2**, *Town of Florence v. ADEQ*, WQAB No.  
26 12-005-WQAB, Board Order (Nov. 14, 2014) (RA001938) (hereinafter "2014 Board  
Order"). The 2014 ALJ Decision was attached as Exhibit 3 to Appellant SWVP's May  
19, 2015 written comments to ADEQ on the draft permit at issue here and the 2014 Board  
Decision was attached as Exhibit 4. Those written comments were incorporated by  
reference into Appellants' September 1, 2016 Notice of Appeal to the Board. **Record-2**,  
*Town of Florence v. ADEQ*, WQAB No. 16-002, Notice of Appeal, at 7-8 (Sept. 1, 2016)  
(RA000059).

1 to conduct full-scale commercial operations on the property.<sup>3</sup>

2 2. After review and public comment, ADEQ issued Temporary APP  
3 No. P-106360 to FCI on July 3, 2013.<sup>4</sup>

4 3. Appellants timely appealed the permit decision to the Board, who  
5 transferred the appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings. Appellants  
6 argued, among other things, that ADEQ's issuance of the permit was arbitrary,  
7 unreasonable, unlawful, or based upon technical judgments that were clearly  
8 invalid; ADEQ's review of FCI's application failed to satisfy numerous statutory,  
9 regulatory, and technical standards; and the permit itself neither satisfied  
10 statutory mandates nor adequately protected the drinking water aquifer.<sup>5</sup>

11 4. An Administrative Law Judge held a 34-day hearing on Appellants'  
12 appeal between March 18, 2014 and May 7, 2014.<sup>6</sup>

13 5. On September 29, 2014, the Administrative Law Judge issued her  
14 145-page decision, in which she recommended that the Temporary APP be  
15 rescinded, based upon her findings that ADEQ's decisions on key parts of the  
16 permit were arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful or based upon a technical  
17 judgment that was clearly invalid.

18 6. The Water Quality Appeals Board accepted all of the Judge's 419  
19 Findings of Fact and all but one of her 73 Conclusions of Law, but decided to  
20 remand the permit to ADEQ, rather than rescind the permit.<sup>7</sup>

21 <sup>3</sup> **Record 2** (Exhibit 3, thereto) 2014 Decision, p. 14, FOF 65 RA001796; A.A.C. § R18-9-  
22 A210(A)(1).

23 <sup>4</sup> **Record-69**, 2017 Board Order, p. 2, FOF 2 (RA007463); **Record-2**, 2014 Decision, p. 3,  
24 FOF 2 (RA001785).

25 <sup>5</sup> **Record -69**, 2017 Board Order, p. 2, FOF 3 (RA007463); **Record-2** 2014 Decision at 3,  
26 FOF 3 (RA001785).

27 <sup>6</sup> **Record -69**, 2017 Board Order, p. 2 (RA007463), FOF 4; 2014 Decision at 3-6, FOF 8-12  
28 2014 Board Order (RA007463-66).

29 <sup>7</sup> **Record-2** (Exhibit 4, thereto) 2014 Board Order (RA001938, *et seq.*).

1 7. No one appealed the Board's Order, which became final.

2 8. To address the Board's Order on remand, FCI applied for a  
3 Significant Amendment to the Temporary APP for the PTF on March 31, 2015.<sup>8</sup>

4 9. Appellants filed written comments during the public comment  
5 period that raised numerous issues and concerns with the draft permit.<sup>9</sup>

6 10. ADEQ issued its decision approving the Significant Amendment to  
7 Temporary APP No. P-106360 ("Significant Amendment") on August 3, 2016.<sup>10</sup>

8 11. On September 1, 2016, the Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal with  
9 the Water Quality Appeals Board in which Appellants alleged 21 legal, technical,  
10 and procedural issues regarding ADEQ's approval of the Significant  
11 Amendment and the terms of the amended permit.<sup>11</sup>

12 12. On December 19, 2016, the Board issued a Procedural Order directing  
13 that it would allow additional written testimony, in the form of sworn affidavits  
14 from experts and legal arguments limited to a 10-page brief, on just three of the  
15 ALJ's 2014 Conclusions of Law: Section 3.8 (PMA and POC); Section 3.7.3.2.1  
16 (Monitoring); and Section 3.7.3.3 (Monitoring).<sup>12</sup>

17 13. The Board held an approximately four-hour hearing on March 6, 2017  
18 under limited procedures to which the parties stipulated. The written expert  
19 affidavits were considered direct testimony and only Board members could  
20 conduct cross-examination. The parties were allowed limited re-direct of their  
21

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22 <sup>8</sup> **Record-1** (RA000001, *et seq.*).

23 <sup>9</sup> **Record-2**, 2014 SWVP-GTIS MR, LLC comments, (incorporated by reference)  
(RA000074 *et seq.*).

24 <sup>10</sup> **Record-1**.

25 <sup>11</sup> **Record-2**, 2014 Board Order (RA001938, *et seq.*).

26 <sup>12</sup> **Record-29**, Board Procedural Order (Dec. 19, 2016) (RA006725 *et seq.*); **Record-69** 2017  
Board Order, p. 7 7-8, FOF 37-39 (RA007468).

1 own witnesses.<sup>13</sup>

2 14. On May 17, 2017, the Board denied the appeal.<sup>14</sup>

3 15. On July 13, 2017, the Board denied Appellants' motion for  
4 rehearing.<sup>15</sup>

5 16. On August 17, 2017, this Appeal was timely filed in the Pinal County  
6 Superior Court.<sup>16</sup> The case was transferred to Maricopa County on October 9,  
7 2017.<sup>17</sup>

8 17. This Appeal is an action to review a final administrative decision by  
9 ADEQ through its Water Quality Appeals Board under A.R.S. Title 49, Chapter  
10 2, Article 3 granting the Temporary APP. Jurisdiction is therefore proper under  
11 [A.R.S. §§ 12-905\(A\)](#) and [41-1092.08\(H\)](#).

### 12 III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

#### 13 A. The Parties

14 18. Appellant Town of Florence is a political subdivision of the State of  
15 Arizona located in Pinal County. The Town is a municipal water provider  
16 holding a designation of assured water supply under Arizona law.<sup>18</sup>

17 19. FCI's property and the pilot test facility are located within the  
18 municipal boundaries of the Town.<sup>19</sup> Figure 1 is an oblique aerial showing  
19 where the PTF will be developed and its proximity to downtown Florence,

20 <sup>13</sup> **Record-61**, Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings (Mar. 6, 2017) ([RA007068 et seq.](#)).

21 <sup>14</sup> **Record-69**, 2017 Board Order ([RA007493 et seq.](#)).

22 <sup>15</sup> **Record-76**, Order Denying Appellants' Request for Rehearing (July 13, 2017)  
([RA007524 et seq.](#)).

23 <sup>16</sup> *Town of Florence v. ADEQ*, Case No. CV201701519, Complaint for Judicial Review of  
Administrative Decision (Aug. 17, 2017).


24 <sup>17</sup> *Id.*, Order (Oct. 9, 2017).

25 <sup>18</sup> **Record-2** (Exhibit 3) 2014 Decision, p.10, FOF 38 ([RA001792](#)); *id.*, p. 12, FOF 52  
([RA001794](#)).

26 <sup>19</sup> *Id.* at 11, FOF 43 ([RA001793](#)).

1 Merrill Ranch (site of Pulte’s development and Southwest Value Partner’s  
2 property) and other features.

3 20. Appellant Pulte Home Company, L.L.C., one of the largest home  
4 builders in the United States, constructed and continues to expand the Anthem  
5 at Merrill Ranch Community on 3,000 acres near FCI’s site in Florence.<sup>20</sup>



17 **Figure 1 – Regional Setting of the FCI Project**

18 21. Anthem is a 3,000-acre master planned community<sup>21</sup> that includes  
19 Pulte’s three brands, two family neighborhoods and an active adult retirement  
20 community. As of 2014, 2,000 homes already had been constructed and sold in

21 <sup>20</sup> *Id.* at 10, FOF 40 (RA001792).

22 <sup>21</sup> **Record-2** (Exhibit 6 thereto) Testimony of Brad Schoenberg, p. 16:7-9 (Ariz. OAH  
23 March 20, 2014) (RA001956). Citations to the official transcript of the 2014 proceedings  
24 in the Office of Administrative Hearings will be identified by the last name of the  
25 witness and the date of the transcript followed by the applicable page and line numbers  
26 and Bates’ number. The official transcript was attached as Exhibit 6 (RA 001952 *et seq.*)  
to Appellant SWVP’s May 19, 2015 written comments on the draft significant  
amendment (RA000073), which were incorporated by reference into Appellants’  
September 1, 2016 Notice of Appeal to the Board. (RA000059 et seq.)

1 the Anthem community,<sup>22</sup> and it is projected that upon completion there will be  
2 7,000 homes and 25,000 to 30,000 people will call Anthem home. Upon build-out,  
3 Anthem's homes will be a mere 300 feet away from the State Land parcel on  
4 which FCI plans to mine.<sup>23</sup>

5 22. Before those homes could be built, Pulte had to construct the  
6 necessary infrastructure. This massive infrastructure system included roads,  
7 curb and gutter, sewer, water, dry and wet utilities, and telecommunications.<sup>24</sup>  
8 Schools, a hospital, medical facilities, a grocery store, bank, retail outlets, and  
9 houses of worship were all necessary components of Anthem at Merrill Ranch.<sup>25</sup>  
10 And most importantly, groundwater water rights for drinking water supplies  
11 had to be obtained and drinking water wells and potable water infrastructure  
12 had to be constructed. In short, Anthem at Merrill Ranch represents Pulte  
13 building a city within Florence at a total projected investment of over one billion  
14 dollars.<sup>26</sup>

15 23. Appellant SWVP is a national real estate developer. SWVP's first  
16 entry into the Merrill Ranch Master Planned Community began with its purchase  
17 of 140 acres of land from Pulte Homes in 2009.<sup>27</sup> SWVP's second property  
18 purchase occurred in early 2010 through a bank foreclosure sale in which it  
19 acquired approximately 4,500 acres.<sup>28</sup> SWVP did not know that FCI was buying  
20 land in the area or that it intended to conduct in-situ leach operations at the site,

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>22</sup> **Record-2**, Schoenberg, March 20 at 27:15-17, ([RA002152](#)).

23 <sup>23</sup> *Id.* at 41:6-42:3; 2014 Decision at 10-11, FOF 40-41, ([RA002156](#)).

24 <sup>24</sup> **Record-2**, Schoenberg, March 20 at 44:3-24, ([RA002156](#)).

25 <sup>25</sup> *Id.* at 29:12-31:9, ([RA002153](#)).

26 <sup>26</sup> *Id.* at 43:17-44:2, ([RA002156](#)).

<sup>27</sup> **Record-2**, Merritt, March 19 at 203:18-25, 222:9-11, ([RA002099](#)) and ([RA002104](#)).

<sup>28</sup> *Id.* at 207:1-9, 222:12-14, ([RA002104](#)).

1 because the bank conducted a sealed bidding process.<sup>29</sup> FCI's property was and  
2 remains zoned for residential development.

3 24. Prior to purchasing both properties, SWVP conducted a thorough  
4 due diligence review. This review confirmed that the Town's vision of a master  
5 planned community consisting of homes, multi-family residences, and  
6 supporting commercial uses was supported by the Town's adopted General  
7 Plan. SWVP also confirmed that there were sufficient water resources available  
8 to support planned development.<sup>30</sup>

9 25. Appellee ADEQ is an agency of the State of Arizona and exercises  
10 authority over the issuance of APPs. ADEQ issued the Temporary APP at issue  
11 in this appeal, Permit No. P-160360, Significant Amendment (Aug. 3, 2016).<sup>31</sup>

12 26. Appellee Board is an appointed board within the Department of  
13 Administration authorized to hear appeals from certain decisions of ADEQ.<sup>32</sup>

14 27. Appellee FCI is a Nevada corporation that is wholly owned by  
15 Taseko Mines Ltd., a Canadian company. FCI owns approximately 1,182 acres  
16 within the municipal boundaries of the Town of Florence, near the Town's  
17 geographic center.<sup>33</sup>

18 28. The Significant Amendment at issue here governs the injection and  
19 recovery of a sulfuric acid solution by FCI, a process that threatens the Town's  
20 drinking water supply.<sup>34</sup>

21  
22 <sup>29</sup> **Record-2** 2014 Decision, p. 11, FOF 44 ([RA001793](#)).

23 <sup>30</sup> **Record-2**, Merritt, March 19 at 207:10-214:11, ([RA002100-02](#)).

24 <sup>31</sup> Record-1.

25 <sup>32</sup> [A.R.S. §§ 49-322](#) and [-323](#).

26 <sup>33</sup> **Record-2** 2014 Decision, p. 8, FOF 26 ([RA001790](#)).

<sup>34</sup> *Id.* p. 1-2, FOF 1 ([RA000059-60](#)); *id.* p. 13, FOF 56 ([RA001795](#)).

## B. Site History

1 29. The copper deposit at FCI's site was first discovered in 1969 and was  
2 evaluated through 1977 by the Continental Oil Company for open pit and shaft  
3 mining. Continental abandoned its efforts when neither option proved  
4 economical.<sup>35</sup>

5 30. In 1997, after acquiring an APP for commercial in-situ leach mining,  
6 BHP Copper began a pilot test at this same site to test the concept of in-situ leach  
7 copper mining and to determine whether it could maintain hydraulic control of  
8 injected acid mining solutions to prevent groundwater contamination  
9 downgradient. This test lasted only 90 days. BHP shut down site operations and  
10 conducted no further tests.<sup>36</sup>

11 31. BHP Copper subsequently sold the property to a local developer,  
12 Harrison Merrill.<sup>37</sup> No further pilot testing or mining activities have been  
13 conducted at this site since 1998.

14 32. The Town of Florence worked with Merrill to annex the property.  
15 The Merrill Ranch Master Plan was approved by the Town Council in December  
16 2003 and a 2007 Development Plan was incorporated into the Town's 2010  
17 General Plan. The General Plan, which included FCI's now residentially-zoned  
18 property, was approved in May 2010 by 71% of the Town's voting residents.  
19 Development has proceeded in compliance with that duly adopted and  
20 approved General Plan, as required by law (Figure 2).

21 33. In 2008, Merrill lost his property in foreclosure during the economic  
22 downturn. His property was sold piecemeal over the next few years by the banks  
23

24 <sup>35</sup> **Record-2** 2014 Decision, p. 7, FOF 16 ([RA001789](#)).

25 <sup>36</sup> *Id.*, pp. 7-8, FOF 18-25 ([RA001789-90](#)).

26 <sup>37</sup> *Id.*, p. 8, FOF 25 ([RA001789](#)).



1 at auction. FCI's predecessor acquired the site through one such auction in 2009.<sup>38</sup>

### 2 **C. The Pilot Test Facility**

3 34. FCI leases a 160-acre State Land parcel, which is surrounded on three  
4 sides by FCI's private property. The State Land parcel is exempt from Town  
5 ordinances that prohibit industrial uses and mining on FCI's private property.  
6 The pilot test at issue would be conducted on this parcel, which is in the  
7 geographic center of the Town and within a master planned community  
8 approved by the Town and its residents years before FCI came to town. (Figures  
9 1 and 2).

10 35. A copper ore body exists below 216 acres that are partly on the state  
11 trust land parcel and partly on FCI' private land.<sup>39</sup> FCI's goal is to develop a  
12 commercial copper mine on this site, employing a process known as in-situ leach  
13 mining.

14 36. The pilot test well field occupies approximately 2.2 acres on the State  
15 Land Parcel leased by FCI. FCI proposes to inject a sulfuric acid mining solution,  
16 a hazardous groundwater contaminant, through four Injection Wells to dissolve  
17 the ore. The resultant solution, consisting of native groundwater, copper, and  
18 other contaminants such as arsenic released into groundwater by the acid, will  
19 be pumped back to the surface through nine Recovery Wells located around the  
20 Injection Wells (Figure 3). The recovered solution will be piped to a solvent  
21 extraction and electrowinning facility to extract copper.<sup>40</sup>

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25 <sup>38</sup> *Id.*, p. 8, FOF 26 (RA001790).

26 <sup>39</sup> **Record-2**, 2014 Decision at 7, FOF 20. (RA001789)

<sup>40</sup> **Record-1**, at 2, § 2.1 (RA000002).



1 37. The injection of FCI's sulfuric acid mining solution is considered a  
2 discharge of pollutants that is regulated under Arizona law through ADEQ's  
3 Aquifer Protection Permit program.<sup>41</sup>

4 38. As the Board previously held, "no evidence indicates that ADEQ has  
5 ever permitted a deep well ISCR mine involving injection into an aquifer other  
6 than BHP's commercial project and FCI's PTF."<sup>42</sup> ADEQ staff have  
7 acknowledged that "issuance of the Temporary APP for the PTF was a novel  
8 experience for ADEQ."<sup>43</sup>

9 39. FCI's sulfuric acid solution will dissolve native minerals and heavy  
10 metals in the aquifer and bedrock and alter groundwater chemistry, increasing  
11 concentrations of many regulated and toxic contaminants (including arsenic,  
12 uranium, lead, and mercury, among many others) in the aquifer.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, it  
13 is imperative that none of the solution or dissolved minerals is allowed to escape  
14 FCI's control and contaminate the local groundwater supply.

15 40. FCI proposes to control the migration of polluted groundwater from  
16 the mined area through hydraulic control of the injected acid mining solutions.  
17 In theory, hydraulic control is achieved by pumping more water from the nine  
18 Recovery Wells than is injected through the four Injection Wells. Monitoring for  
19 hydraulic control will be conducted at seven Observation Wells around the well  
20 field (Figure 3). Although the Significant Amendment has certain Alert Levels

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22 <sup>41</sup> [A.R.S. §§ 49-201\(12\); 49-203\(A\)\(4\)](#) ; and [Title 49, Chpt. 2, Art. 3](#); **Record-2** 2014 ALJ  
Decision, at 121, Conclusion of Law ("COL") 1 (RA001903).


23 <sup>42</sup> **Record-2** 2014 Decision, p. 134, COL 47 (RA001916).


24 <sup>43</sup> 2014 Decision, at 14, FOF 62 (RA001796).

25 <sup>44</sup> See **Record-1**, Table 4.1-7 (RA000044) (listing contaminants for which FCI must  
26 monitor); **Record-21**, FCI Significant Amendment Application, Attach. 4, Exhibit 4-A  
(RA006249) (Revised Exhibit 10C), Table 3.1 (listing estimated concentrations of  
chemicals and minerals in extracted groundwater during in-situ leach operations).

1 for the Observation Wells, exceedances of Alert Levels are not considered permit  
2 violations.

3 **Figure 3: FCI Pilot Test Well Field**





**Figure 4: Geologic Cross-Section of Pilot Test Well Field**

41. A geologic cross-section of FCI's pilot test site (Figure 4) shows that the Lower Basin Fill Unit (LBFU), which produces good-quality groundwater for the Town's drinking water supply, overlies the copper-ore-bearing oxide unit

1 bedrock (Figure 4, at A). The LBFU is the primary source of drinking water for  
2 the Town of Florence, the Merrill Ranch development, and the surrounding  
3 region.

4 42. The PTF well field (Figure 4, at B), where different wells will inject  
5 sulfuric acid and remove copper-bearing leachate, is a 2.2-acre area on the State  
6 Land parcel. The Pollution Management Area approved by the current Board  
7 and discussed below (Figure 4, at C), is an approximately 500-foot ring around  
8 the pilot test well field. Permit compliance is to be measured at POC wells  
9 outside of this area. The distance to and location of the compliance points in the  
10 Significant Amendment is effectively identical to those that were rejected by the  
11 Board in the original Temporary APP as “arbitrary, unreasonable, unlawful or  
12 based upon a technical judgment that was clearly invalid.”

13 43. Immediately west of the pilot test well field (Figure 4, at D), the  
14 geologic contact between the LBFU and oxide unit “starts to slope  
15 downward.”<sup>45</sup> Groundwater at this location generally flows to the west (to the  
16 left) and there is no hydrologic barrier between the LBFU and oxide unit along  
17 this interface. FCI has never provided a cross-section going south to north  
18 across the pilot test; such a section would show top of the PTF is not flat but  
19 slopes markedly toward the north such that the LBFU is inside the PTF. Thus  
20 pollutants that escape from the pilot test well field can flow horizontally into  
21 the LBFU, the Town’s drinking water supply.

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25 <sup>45</sup> **Record-2**, 2014 Decision, p. 63, FOF 221 (quoting ADEQ’s response to public  
26 comments) ([RA001845](#)); *see also id.*, p. 6, FOF 16 (“Directly to the west of the PTF well  
field, the bedrock slopes down to a fault”) ([RA001788](#)).

1 **IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES**

- 2 A. Did the Board act contrary to the law, arbitrarily and capriciously when  
3 approving a temporary permit that violates the Board's prior,  
4 unappealed decision?
- 5 B. Did the Board act arbitrarily and capriciously, abuse its discretion, and  
6 rule contradictory to substantial evidence in upholding a Pollution  
7 Management Area upon which key permit terms are based that is  
8 unlawful, unreasonable, and technically invalid?
- 9 C. Did the Board act arbitrarily and capriciously, abuse its discretion, and  
10 rule contradictory to substantial evidence in upholding Point of  
11 Compliance Well locations that are unlawful and unreasonable?
- 12 D. Did the Board act arbitrarily and capriciously, abuse its discretion, and  
13 rule contradictory to substantial evidence in upholding a permit Alert  
14 Level<sup>46</sup> for fluid electrical conductivity at FCI's Observation Wells that  
15 is unlawful and unreasonable?
- 16 E. Did the Board act arbitrarily and capriciously, abuse its discretion, or  
17 make a decision unsupported by substantial evidence when it dismissed  
18 the following claims without presentation of evidence or a hearing?
- 19 • That ADEQ violated [A.R.S. § 49-241](#) and applicable law by  
20 failing to provide proper and accurate information in the public  
21 notice of the Significant Amendment, by failing to properly  
22 record, transcribe, and respond to public comments, and by  
23 publishing a fact sheet that contained significant misleading  
24 statements.
  - That ADEQ's permit decision was predetermined long before  
the public comment period was opened and ADEQ acted with  
a closed mind to public comment, in violation of its due process  
obligation to provide a meaningful opportunity for the public  
to comment before a decision is made.

19 **V. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

20 **A. Standard of Review**

21 This Court reviews the Board's decision under the following standard: if  
22 "the Court concludes that the agency's action is contrary to law, is not supported  
23 by substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious or is an abuse of discretion,"  
24

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25 <sup>46</sup> An "Alert Level" is "a value or criterion established in an individual [APP] that serves  
26 as an early warning indicating a potential violation of a permit condition related to  
BADCT or the discharge of a pollutant to groundwater." [A.A.C. § R18-9-101\(2\)](#).

1 the Court must reverse, modify or vacate and remand the agency action.<sup>47</sup> In this  
2 action, Appellants request the Court reverse the Board’s 2017 Decision and  
3 remand to the agency.

4 The Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation *de novo*.<sup>48</sup> The Court  
5 must reverse an administrative decision if it is contrary to law.<sup>49</sup> Even when an  
6 agency has discretion, it does not have discretion to incorrectly interpret the  
7 law.<sup>50</sup>

8 When a statute is part of a broader statutory scheme concerning a single  
9 subject, the Court must construe it in conjunction with related statutes, giving  
10 effect to each provision.<sup>51</sup> In interpreting statutes, the Court must “give meaning  
11 to ‘each word, phrase, clause, and sentence ... so that no part of the statute will  
12 be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.’”<sup>52</sup>

13 ADEQ and FCI did not appeal from the 2014 Decision remanding the  
14 Temporary APP to ADEQ to address several significant flaws. This final,  
15 unappealed decision established the law of the case and is entitled to preclusive  
16 effect. The “law of the case” doctrine requires appellate decisions from which no  
17 further appeal is sought to be “strictly followed.”<sup>53</sup> It is designed to avoid

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18 <sup>47</sup> [A.R.S. § 12-910\(E\)](#).

19 <sup>48</sup> [J.L.F. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys.](#), 208 Ariz. 159, 161, ¶ 10, 91 P.3d 1002  
(App. 2004).

20 <sup>49</sup> [A.R.S. § 12-910\(E\)](#).

21 <sup>50</sup> See [W. Sun Contractors Co. v. Superior Court In & For County of Maricopa](#), 159 Ariz. 223,  
229, 766 P.2d 96, 102 (App. 1988) (City’s discretion does not permit incorrect legal  
22 determination); [Sanderson Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.](#), 205 Ariz. 202, 205 ¶ 8, 68  
23 P.3d 428, 431 (App.2003) (“While we consider the agency’s interpretation of the statutes it  
administers, we review the law *de novo*.”).

24 <sup>51</sup> [Johnson v. Mohave County](#), 206 Ariz. 330, 333, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d 1051 (App. 2003).

25 <sup>52</sup> [Herman v. City of Tucson](#), 197 Ariz. 430, 434, ¶ 14, 4 P.3d 973 (App. 1999) (citation  
omitted).

26 <sup>53</sup> [Bogard v. Cannon & Wendt Elec. Co., Inc.](#), 221 Ariz. 325, 334, ¶ 30, 212 P.3d 17, 26 (App.  
2009).



1 horizontal appeals, encourage an orderly end to litigation and to avoid so-called  
2 “judge shopping.”<sup>54</sup> An adjudicative determination by an administrative  
3 tribunal, such as the 2014 Decision, is entitled to the same collateral estoppel  
4 effect as a judgment of a court.<sup>55</sup>

### 5 **B. Arizona’s Aquifer Protection Permit Program**

6 In 1986, the State of Arizona adopted the Environmental Quality Act,  
7 created the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ), and  
8 recognized the precious and delicate nature of groundwater within this desert  
9 state by designating all of its aquifers as drinking water aquifers. Along with  
10 that designation, Arizona enacted the Aquifer Protection Permit (APP) program  
11 to proactively protect our State’s groundwater from contamination.<sup>56</sup>

12 Under the APP program, all aquifers are protected for drinking water use  
13 unless exempted under specific statutory procedures. A key protection under the  
14 program is that ADEQ establish POC monitoring well locations around a facility,  
15 points at which groundwater standards will be monitored and enforced. The  
16 legislature intended that POCs, like all other APP requirements, be located and  
17 operated to ensure “that the facility will be so designed, constructed and  
18 operated as to ensure the greatest degree of discharge reduction achievable.”<sup>57</sup>

19  
20 <sup>54</sup> [Powell-Cerkoney v. TCR-Montana Ranch Joint Venture, II](#), 176 Ariz. 275, 279, 860 P.2d  
1328, 1332 (App. 1993).

21 <sup>55</sup> [A. Miner Contracting, Inc. v. Toho-Tolani County Imp. Dist.](#), 233 Ariz. 249, 254, ¶ 16, 311  
22 P.3d 1062, 1068 (App. 2013) (adjudicative determinations have res judicata effect if they  
23 entail the essential elements of adjudication, including adequate notice, the right to  
24 present evidence and legal argument, and a rule of finality); [Hawkins v. State](#), 183 Ariz.  
100, 103, 900 P.2d 1236, 1239 (App. 1995) (res judicata and collateral estoppel may apply  
25 to decisions of administrative agencies); [Casillas v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Sec.](#), 153  
26 Ariz. 579, 581, 739 P.2d 800, 802 (App. 1986) (“Collateral estoppel can be applied to  
factual issues decided by an administrative agency acting in its judicial capacity.”)

<sup>56</sup> Environmental Quality Act, Laws 1986, Ch. 368 (eff. Aug. 13, 1986); [A.R.S. § 49-224\(B\)](#).

<sup>57</sup> [A.R.S. § 49-243\(B\)](#).

1 At the POC wells, FCI must demonstrate that its facility will not cause or  
2 contribute to a violation of an Aquifer Water Quality Standard or, if a standard  
3 for a pollutant is exceeded in an aquifer at the time of permit issuance, no  
4 additional degradation of the aquifer relative to that pollutant will occur as a  
5 result of the discharge from the proposed facility.<sup>58</sup> To ensure that the POC wells  
6 are properly placed to provide meaningful monitoring of facility operations and  
7 prevent pollution of drinking water supplies, the legislature required that the  
8 POC wells be placed at “the limit of the [PMA],” which it defined as the “limit  
9 projected in the horizontal plane of the area on which pollutants are or will be  
10 placed.”<sup>59</sup>

11 The legislature did allow for placement of POCs up to 750 feet outside the  
12 PMA, but only under two specific exceptions, neither of which is met here. First,  
13 alternative locations are allowed if it “technically impracticable or  
14 inappropriate” to place them at the PMA. Second, alternative locations are  
15 allowed if it would be “substantially less costly.” But in no event may the POCs  
16 be placed further from the PMA that “is necessary for purposes of this  
17 paragraph” or so as to “result in an increased threat to an existing or reasonably  
18 foreseeable drinking water source.”<sup>60</sup>

19 Given the complex hydrogeology in the area, the novel nature of FCI’s  
20 untried copper extraction process, and the Town’s heavy dependence on  
21 groundwater for its drinking water supply, ADEQ’s regulatory role and  
22 oversight responsibilities are critical to the people of Florence and their drinking  
23 water supply. As discussed below, the Significant Amendment does not satisfy  
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25 <sup>58</sup> [A.A.C. § R18-9-A202\(A\)\(6\).](#)

25 <sup>59</sup> [A.R.S. § 49-244\(1\).](#)

26 <sup>60</sup> *Id.* [§ 49-244\(2\).](#)

1 applicable standards of the APP program and does not adequately protect the  
2 Town of Florence’s drinking water supply.

3 **C. The Board’s Approval of an Unlawful, Unreasonable, and Technically**  
4 **Indefensible Pollution Management Area Was Arbitrary and**  
5 **Capricious, an Abuse of Discretion, and Contradictory to Substantial**  
6 **Evidence in this Case.**

7 Of the various forms of monitoring required in the Significant  
8 Amendment, the Point of Compliance (“POC”) Wells are the key points for  
9 monitoring and enforcement of Aquifer Water Quality Standards that protect  
10 downgradient drinking water supplies. The Board found that the POC Wells in  
11 the original Temporary APP were “too far from ‘the limit projected in the  
12 horizontal plane of the area on which [lixiviant] will be placed,’ or PMA, to  
13 comply with [A.R.S. § 49-244\(2\)\(b\)\(iii\)](#).”<sup>61</sup> The POC Well locations in the  
14 Significant Amendment are the same or substantially the same as those that the  
15 Board rejected. This is due, in part, to the improper and unlawful manipulation  
16 of the “PMA” standards in ADEQ’s review on remand. The Board’s approval of  
17 the revised PMA ignored its previous binding decision regarding the proper  
18 designation of a PMA and was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and  
19 contrary to substantial evidence.

20 **1. The Standards Applicable to PMAs.**

21 ADEQ must “designate a point or points of compliance for each facility  
22 receiving an [APP].” These compliance locations are determined by reference to  
23 the Pollution Management Area (“PMA”), which ADEQ must designate based  
24 upon the site-specific discharge activities of the applicant.<sup>62</sup> The Legislature has

25 <sup>61</sup> **Record-2** 2014 Decision at 140, COL 59 ([RA001922](#)).

26 <sup>62</sup> [A.R.S. § 49-244](#); ADEQ, *Individual APP Hydrology Substantive Review Checklist*, at 6  
(November 2014) (“The PMA will be used to determine the number and location of  
points of compliance for the facilities at the site.”) (available at  
<http://www.azdeq.gov/environ/water/permits/download/apphydrocheck.dot>).

1 defined the PMA as “the limit projected in the horizontal plane of the area on  
2 which pollutants are or will be placed,” and includes the “horizontal space taken  
3 up by any liner, dike, or other barrier designed to contain pollutants in the  
4 facility.”<sup>63</sup> The Board previously concluded that “[A.R.S. § 49-244\(1\)](#) is not  
5 ambiguous: the PMA ‘is the limit projected in the horizontal plane of the area on  
6 which pollutants are or will be placed’ or for the PTF, *where the lixiviant will be*  
7 *injected and recovered.*”<sup>64</sup> In layman’s terms, the PMA is basically the area that FCI  
8 will be polluting during injection operations.

9 Once a proper PMA is selected, the POC wells must be located along that  
10 boundary, unless certain statutory exceptions are met. Arizona law requires that  
11 Temporary APPs are drafted to ensure “the greatest degree of discharge  
12 reduction achievable.”<sup>65</sup> In keeping with this requirement, the Board previously  
13 held that the PMA should be drawn as small as reasonably possible, both to limit  
14 the spread of contaminants and to help ensure that the corresponding POC wells  
15 are located where they will provide “meaningful monitoring” during facility  
16 operations for contaminant escapes and exceedances.<sup>66</sup>

17 The PMA also can include “horizontal space taken up by any liner, dike or  
18 other barrier designed to contain pollutants in the facility.”<sup>67</sup> ADEQ’s Best  
19 Available Demonstrated Control Technology (BADCT) Mining Guidance  
20 Manual provides that a “barrier” for in-situ leach operations can include  
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23 <sup>63</sup> [A.R.S. § 49-244\(1\)](#).

24 <sup>64</sup> **Record-2**, 2014 Decision at 136, COL 50 (emphasis added) ([RA001918](#)).

25 <sup>65</sup> [A.R.S. § 49-243\(B\)\(1\)](#).

26 <sup>66</sup> **Record-2**, 2014 Decision at 140-41, COL 60 ([RA001922-23](#)).

<sup>67</sup> [A.R.S. § 49-244\(1\)](#).

1 pumping that creates an inward groundwater gradient to “contain, capture and  
2 recycle” injected solutions.<sup>68</sup>

### 3           **2. In 2014, the Board Rejected FCI’s Original PMA.**

4           The Board held in 2014 that the PMA in the original Temporary APP had  
5 no legal or scientific basis and that FCI had tried to justify it after the fact with  
6 arguments.<sup>69</sup> The Board discussed the “area on which pollutants are or will be  
7 placed” in the context of the Temporary APP as follows:

8           Although courts defer to agencies on technical matters within the  
9 scope of the agency’s authority and expertise, that deference “is not  
10 to be a device that emasculates the significance of . . . review.” An  
11 agency may not disregard clear statutory directives or legislative  
12 intent. [A.R.S. § 49-244\(1\)](#) is not ambiguous: the PMA “is the limit  
13 projected in the horizontal plane of the area on which pollutants are  
14 or will be placed,” or *for the PTF, where the lixiviant will be injected and  
recovered*. FCI’s applications for the Temporary APP and for the UIC  
permit made clear that lixiviant would be placed in the [injection  
recovery zone] and was *not expected to migrate more than one or two well  
spacings to the northwest of the PTF well field*. All of FCI’s witnesses  
agreed with this interpretation of the unequivocal statements in FCI’s  
applications.<sup>70</sup>

15 Because FCI could not justify an over-sized PMA for a 2.2-acre pilot test well field  
16 under the facts or the law applicable to FCI’s pilot test, the Board rejected the  
17 PMA in the original Temporary APP.<sup>71</sup> In its 2014 Decision, the Board concluded

18 \_\_\_\_\_  
19 <sup>68</sup> BADCT Manual, § 3.4.5.3.1 (2004) (available at  
<http://legacy.azdeq.gov/envIRON/water/wastewater/download/badctmanual.pdf>).

20 <sup>69</sup> **Record-2**, 2014 Decision at 137, COL 52 ([RA001919](#)) (“A barrier consisting of a 1,600-  
21 foot cone of depression to justify a 200-acre PMA for a 2.2-acre PTF well field would  
22 render superfluous the definition in [A.R.S. § 49-244\(1\)](#) that “[t]he [PMA] is the limit  
23 projected in the horizontal plane of the area on which pollutants are or will be placed.”);  
24 *id.* at 139, COL 55 ([RA001921](#)) (“Appellants established through FCI’s applications for  
the Temporary APP and UIC permit that FCI’s witnesses’ testimony that a 1,600 or  
1,000-foot cone of depression justified the PMA was a post hoc rationalization for the  
PMA that was first asserted at the hearing, not a permitted control mechanism under  
BADCT.”).

25 <sup>70</sup> **Record-2** 2014 ALJ Decision, at 136, COL 50 ([RA001918](#)) (emphasis added).

26 <sup>71</sup> **Record-2** 2014 ALJ Decision at 137, COL 52 ([RA001919](#)); *id.* at 139-141, COL 55 to COL  
61 ([RA001921-1923](#)).

1 pollutants would migrate no more than one or two well spacings, which requires  
2 the Point of Compliance wells to be no more than 70-140 feet from the recovery  
3 wells.<sup>72</sup> No appeal was taken from this determination.

### 4 **3. The PMA in the Significant Amendment Remains Nothing More** 5 **than an Arbitrary Line.**

6 On remand, FCI's Significant Amendment application proposed a PMA for  
7 the pilot test well field formed by a line drawn at an approximate 500-foot radius  
8 around the outermost pilot test wells (Figure 5).<sup>73</sup> This area is approximately 32  
9 acres, and in some places includes land that is *farther* from the pilot test well field  
10 than the PMA that was rejected by the Board in 2014. Citing the BADCT Manual,  
11 FCI purportedly based its new PMA upon the "centermost" part of the cone of  
12 depression created by Recovery Well pumping.<sup>74</sup> But during operations, the 2.2  
13 acre pilot test well field is designed to entirely contain all of the pollutants that  
14 FCI intends to inject.<sup>75</sup> The Significant Amendment PMA is thus more than an  
15 order of magnitude larger than it would be if it were properly drawn and will  
16 allow the contamination of groundwater that the law otherwise requires be  
17 protected.

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18 <sup>72</sup> A well spacing is 50 to 70 feet. See **Record-2** 2014 ALJ Decision at 103, FOF 361  
19 ([RA001885](#)).

20 <sup>73</sup> **Record-69**, 2017 Board Order at 4, FOF 16 ([RA007565](#)).

21 <sup>74</sup> **Record-61**, WQAB Hearing Transcript, Testimony of Maribeth Greenslade at 91:3-5  
(Mar. 6, 2017), ([RA007158](#)).

22 <sup>75</sup> **Record-2** 2014 ALJ Decision at 84, FOF 296 ([RA001866](#)) ("FCI's UIC permit application  
23 provided further that FCI anticipated that under normal operational conditions, fluid  
24 would be contained within the outermost ring of recovery wells in the PTF well field");  
25 *id.* at 85, FOF 298 ([RA001867](#)) (FCI's expert "Mr. Nicholls testified that hydraulic control  
26 under FCI's application and the Temporary APP did not require injected solutions to  
stay within the area of injection and recovery wells, but only to remain generally within  
the footprint of the PTF well field."); *id.* at 86, FOF 302 ([RA001868](#)) (FCI's expert stated  
that "The area where the water quality could be affected by the operation of the leaching  
facility extends a few well spacings beyond the physical location of the injection and  
recovery wells, and is approximated by the outline of the PTF Wellfield boundary...").

1 FCI has never taken a consistent position on the cone of depression created  
2 by its recovery wells, variously characterizing it in the first appeal as extending  
3 a few feet beyond the recovery wells, thousands of feet outward, and basin-  
4 wide.<sup>76</sup> In the 2014 Decision, the cone of depression excuse for placing the POC  
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22 <sup>76</sup> **Record-2**, Exhibit 6, 2014 OAH Hearing Transcript, ADEQ Testimony, April 4 at 161:3-  
23 14, ([RA003141](#)), (cone of depression extends a “little bit” past the well field boundaries);  
24 *id.* at 161:24-162:19, ([RA003141](#)), (ADEQ was never told of a 1,000-foot cone of  
25 depression during its review and knew of no relationship between the cone of  
26 depression and PMA); Adrian Brown Testimony, April 25 at 35:22-36:2, ([RA004016](#)),  
(cone of depression extends 1,600 feet from center of PTF well field); Adrian Brown  
Testimony, April 29 at 76:12-22, ([RA004379](#)), (the commercial cone of depression would  
extend across the entire groundwater basin).

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


Figure 5:

PTF Well

Field, Original PMA, Revised PMA



1 wells so far away they could not trigger a permit violation until years after the  
2 project shut down was correctly rejected. For this appeal, FCI's arguments for a  
3 PMA drawn at a 500-foot radius around the well field are similarly vague and  
4 arbitrary. One of FCI's experts testified at the Board hearing that, although the  
5 cone of depression from the pilot test well field "will go out so many thousands  
6 of feet," FCI had to locate the PMA somewhere inside FCI's property boundary,  
7 so "we had to then say, All right. Well, we've got to pick a distance."<sup>77</sup> ADEQ  
8 testified that although the cone of depression "will go out indefinitely . . . this is  
9 the centermost part, the 500-foot radius of that cone of depression."<sup>78</sup> FCI's expert  
10 echoed that "We want it to be more in the center of the cone of depression,  
11 because then there's a larger amount of drawdown, which is a larger pressure  
12 difference, which is a stronger inward hydraulic gradient."<sup>79</sup> But FCI's expert  
13 also acknowledged that there was no "magic" to the 500-foot radius.<sup>80</sup>

14 This testimony makes clear that the PMA in the Significant Amendment is  
15 as arbitrary as the original PMA. Rather than using the actual barrier to  
16 contaminant escape – the capture zone of the recovery wells, which can be  
17 readily mapped – FCI used the cone of depression argument to pick a PMA that  
18 best suited their desire to keep the point of compliance wells as far from the well  
19 field as possible. But "we've got to pick a distance," or "the centermost part" of  
20 the cone of depression are not defensible technical justifications, and there is no  
21 support in applicable statutes or regulations for such random choices. As one  
22 Board member said at the hearing, "There seems to be some arbitrariness in terms

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23 <sup>77</sup> **Record-61**, WQAB Hearing Transcript, Testimony of Phil Lagas at 143:9-144:1,  
24 ([RA007210-11](#)), (Mar. 6, 2017).

25 <sup>78</sup> *Id.*, Testimony of Maribeth Greenslade at 91:3-5, ([RA007158](#)).

26 <sup>79</sup> *Id.*, Testimony of Phil Lagas at 144:1-5, ([RA007211](#)).

<sup>80</sup> *Id.*, Testimony of Mark Nicholls at 138:9-20, ([RA007205](#)).

1 of that—the 500 foot.”<sup>81</sup> Moreover, these justifications ignore the testimony of  
2 FCI’s experts and ADEQ—testimony relied on by the Board for the 2014  
3 Decision—that contaminants would be contained generally within the  
4 boundaries of the pilot test well field during operations and travel no more than  
5 one to two well spacings (70-140 feet).

6 The “cone of depression barrier” argument distracts from the real issue.  
7 FCI designed the pilot test to contain contaminants within the well field. FCI has  
8 stated repeatedly that, even in a worst case scenario, contaminants would not  
9 travel far beyond the well field, even five years after pilot test operations end  
10 (Figure 6).<sup>82</sup> Thus, the well field is the area on which pollutants will be placed.  
11 Even allowing for a reasonable “barrier” for contaminants to travel past the outer  
12 Observation Wells, the correct PMA when drawn pursuant to statutory  
13 requirements and the 2014 Decision, is significantly smaller than the line  
14 currently approved by the Board.

15 ADEQ relied on FCI’s “barrier” argument to base the PMA on an arbitrary  
16 “cone of depression” radius, while ignoring the facts applicable to this project.  
17 No matter how large a cone of depression FCI generates with the Recovery Wells,  
18 the system is designed so that contaminants should never leave the well field, or  
19 travel more than one to two well spacings. Therefore, the well field boundary—  
20 not an arbitrary 500-foot line—is the true area on which pollutants will be placed  
21 and is the only area that can be designated a PMA under Arizona law, and is  
22 what was decided by the 2014 Decision.


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<sup>81</sup>*Id.*, at 96:12-15, (RA007163).

25 <sup>82</sup> *See, e.g., Record-2* 2014 Decision, at 112, FOF 387; *id.* at 113, FOF 389 (RA001894-95)  
26 (ADEQ testified that “after five years, FCI’s fate and transport model predicted that sulfate would migrate only 150 feet”).

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**Figure 6: PMA, POC Wells, and Worst-Case Contaminant Plume After Five Years**

1                   **4. The PMA Prevents Monitoring and Enforcement Before**  
2                   **Contaminants Reach the Drinking Water Aquifer.**

3                   One of the most positive components in both the 2013 and 2016 permits is  
4 ADEQ's prohibition against any contamination escaping the bedrock and  
5 reaching the Lower Basin Fill Unit ("LBFU"). This provision is set out in Permit  
6 Section 2.3.1, which states that "Hydraulic control over the injected solutions  
7 shall be maintained during the operating life of the facility. In-situ solutions shall  
8 be injected and *contained within the oxide unit*" (emphasis added). Any FCI failure  
9 to contain the in situ solution within the oxide unit means solution had escaped  
10 to the LBFU, in violation of this provision. To its credit, FCI has proposed and  
11 ADEQ has approved extensive monitoring to detect leachate excursions upward  
12 into the LBFU. But movement from the oxide unit to the laterally adjoining LBFU  
13 is another matter.

14                   The Significant Amendment's Pollution Management Area (PMA) is fatally  
15 flawed because it allows pollutants to enter the LBFU, the Town's drinking water  
16 supply, years before they could be detected by POC Wells. At a minimum,  
17 pollutants must travel 500 feet or more beyond the Observation Wells before  
18 reaching the closest POC Wells. As can be seen in Figure 7, which is FCI's own  
19 conceptual cross-section of the PTF, the oxide unit drops off precipitously just  
20 beyond the Observation Wells, such that within the PMA the LBFU is not only  
21 present but is hundreds of feet thick.<sup>83</sup> As a result, contaminants will flow into  
22 the LBFU long before reaching the POC Wells, and a large volume of LBFU could  
23 be contaminated inside the PMA without reaching a POC and triggering  
24 enforcement. Consequently, because the POCs are located so far from the PTF  
25 well field, the prohibition against any LBFU contamination in Permit Section

26 <sup>83</sup> **Record-2**, Exhibit 7, FCI Figure D-11, EW USDW cross-section 746013N Looking North (December 2015) (RA004692).

2.3.1. becomes meaningless. The *only* way FCI can avoid a PMA that extends into the LBFU at this location is to place the PMA line at the pilot test well field




Figure 7: PTF Well Field and POC Wells

1 boundary and just outside the Observation Wells. Any larger area will allow FCI  
2 to pollute the aquifer that provides the Town's drinking water supply without  
3 legal consequence. This is why the Board's 2014 Decision described a one to two  
4 well spacing limit for the location of the Pollution Management Area and the  
5 Point of Compliance wells.

6 **D. The Board Acted Arbitrarily and Capriciously, Abused its Discretion,  
7 and Ruled Contradictory to Substantial Evidence in Upholding POC  
8 Well Locations that are Unlawful and Unreasonable.**

9 Point of Compliance ("POC") Wells are the key enforcement points in the  
10 Significant Amendment.<sup>84</sup> Once a proper PMA is determined, the point or points  
11 of compliance are defined by the statute to be "the limit of the pollution  
12 management area," unless the applicant can demonstrate that one of two  
13 alternative locations should be approved.<sup>85</sup> Arizona Water Quality Standards,  
14 designed to protect groundwater for use as a drinking water supply, are enforced  
15 only at the points of compliance. If a contaminant exceeds those standards in a  
16 POC Well, ADEQ can require amendments to the permit, require corrective  
17 actions to address the violation, issue administrative compliance orders, seek  
18 injunctive relief to protect the public health, or seek civil or criminal penalties.<sup>86</sup>  
19 Exceedances of Alert Levels at other monitoring points in the Significant  
20 Amendment do not give rise to similar enforcement authority, potentially  
21 leaving significant contamination unchecked until it reaches a POC Well.

22 With regard to the pilot test well field, the Significant Amendment  
23 establishes six POC Wells in the same or nearly the same locations as in the

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24 <sup>84</sup> [A.R.S. § 49-244](#).

25 <sup>85</sup> *Id.* [§ 49-244](#).

26 <sup>86</sup> **Record-1**, Significant Amendment at 23-24, § 2.6.4 ([RA000023-24](#)); [A.R.S. § 49-261](#), [-262](#), and [-263](#).

1 original Temporary APP (Figure 8).<sup>87</sup> If contaminants escape FCI’s control, it will  
2 take them up to almost 12 years to reach these POC locations, which will be  
3 nearly a decade after the pilot test ends. This guarantees that FCI will not violate  
4 water quality standards at the POC Wells during pilot test operations, regardless  
5 of whether its hydraulic control system really works. For this reason, the Board  
6 unequivocally rejected those compliance well locations in 2014, finding that they  
7 were “arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful” and did “not allow any  
8 meaningful monitoring of pollutants.”<sup>88</sup> But upon review of the Significant  
9 Amendment three years later, the Board accepted the same (or nearly same)  
10 locations as reasonable and lawful.<sup>89</sup>

11 On remand after the 2014 Decision, FCI did not move the POC Wells in any  
12 significant manner. Groundwater still flows in the same directions at the same  
13 rates. And contaminants escaping from FCI’s well field still will not reach these  
14 compliance wells until many years after the pilot test is complete. Given those  
15 unchanged factual circumstances, the compliance points still do “not allow any  
16 meaningful monitoring of pollutants” from FCI’s pilot test, regardless of any  
17 justifications presented to the Board.

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
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23 <sup>87</sup> **Record-21**, FCI application at 3-1 (RA006198) (“The proposed point of compliance  
24 (POC) wells described in the March 1, 2012 Temporary APP application remain  
unchanged with the exception of a minor adjustment of the location of one proposed  
POC well.”).

25 <sup>88</sup> **Record-2**, 2014 Decision at 136-141, COL 50-61 (RA001918).

26 <sup>89</sup> **Record-69**, 2017 Board Order at 11-12, COL 55-56 (RA007472-73).

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**Figure 8: POC Locations, Original Temporary and Significant Amendment**



1                   **1. POC Wells M54-O and M54-LBF Are Unlawful, Unreasonable, and**  
2                   **Do Not Provide Meaningful Monitoring.**

3                   Two of the six POC Wells associated with the well field, M54-O and M54-  
4 LBF, are located at the PMA line (Figure 8).<sup>90</sup> But because that PMA is  
5 unreasonable and illegal, the locations for these two POC Wells are similarly  
6 unreasonable and illegal. These two POC Wells are approximately 730 feet from  
7 the nearest injection well in FCI's pilot well field.<sup>91</sup> If contaminants escape FCI's  
8 control, it will take many years beyond the two-year life of the PTF for mining  
9 pollutants to reach these wells.<sup>92</sup> Moreover, contaminants will already have  
10 entered the LBFU long before reaching the closest POC wells, violating the  
11 permit before any notice to ADEQ or the public.<sup>93</sup> Therefore, these two wells do  
12 not provide "any meaningful monitoring of pollutants that may escape the PMA  
13 during PTF operations."<sup>94</sup>

14                   **2. Four Other Existing POC Wells Have Not Moved and Remain**  
15                   **Unlawful and Unreasonable.**

16                   The four other POC wells (M23-UBF, M22-O, M15-GU, and M14-GL)  
17 associated with the well field were originally drilled by BHP in the 1990s for a  
18 full commercial mining project that has nothing to do with FCI's pilot test 20  
19 years later.<sup>95</sup> The closest of these POC Wells is approximately 800 feet—and 10 to

20 <sup>90</sup> **Record-69**, 2017 Board Order at 4, FOF 19 ([RA007465](#)).

21 <sup>91</sup> Record-2, 2014 Decision, p. 92, FOF 323 ([RA001874](#)).

22 <sup>92</sup> *Id.* at 96, FOF 338 ([RA001878](#)) (citing testimony of FCI expert Nicholls, who  
23 "acknowledged that if contaminants escaped, they could travel for years before being  
24 detected by the POC wells, long after the expiration of the Temporary APP.").

25 <sup>93</sup> See Figure 4, *supra*.

26 <sup>94</sup> **Record-2**, 2014 Decision at 140-41, COL 60 ([RA001922](#)).

<sup>95</sup> *Id.* at 136, COL 49 ([RA001918](#)) ("Temporary APP No. P-106360 cannot authorize FCI  
to use the same POC wells as the commercial APP unless standing alone, the wells meet  
statutory requirements for the PTF."); **Record-69**, 2017 Board Order at 4, FOF 19  
([RA007465](#)).

1 12 years of groundwater travel—from the nearest pilot test well (Figure 8).<sup>96</sup> In  
2 the 2014 Decision, the Board rejected these compliance locations, finding that  
3 they were too far from the pilot test well field to comply with [A.R.S. § 49-244](#).<sup>97</sup>  
4 Directly defying these findings, ADEQ’s Significant Amendment authorized the  
5 same four POC wells that the Board rejected in 2014. And now the Board itself  
6 has approved those same four POC locations. Nothing has changed since 2014 to  
7 justify the Board’s approval in this appeal of those same compliance points that  
8 it previously found were “arbitrary, unreasonable, unlawful or based upon a  
9 technical judgment that was clearly invalid.”

10 In 2014 and still today FCI attempted to justify these POC locations under  
11 [A.R.S. § 49-244\(2\)\(b\)](#), which allows alternative POC locations if the applicant  
12 demonstrates that selection of an alternative POC will allow installation and  
13 operation of monitoring facilities that are “substantially less costly” than placing  
14 the POC at the default location at the limit of the PMA.<sup>98</sup> This excuse was not  
15 accepted in the 2014 Decision.

16 It is implicit in the statute that protection of the aquifer will not be  
17 compromised by the use of an alternative POC that is substantially less costly.  
18 Alternative POC locations may only be approved if they are no further from the  
19 default location at the limit of the PMA than is necessary; (2) they will not result  
20 in an increased threat to an existing or reasonably foreseeable drinking water

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21  
22 <sup>96</sup> **Record-2**, 2014 Decision at 94, FOF 333 ([RA001876](#)) (ADEQ “estimated that it would  
take approximately 11.6 years for contaminants from the PTF to reach the POC wells.”).

23 <sup>97</sup> *Id.* at 140, COL 59 ([RA001922](#)) (“The substantially less costly POC wells cannot define  
24 the PMA under [A.R.S. § 49-244\(1\)](#) and cannot be used as POC wells for the PTF unless  
25 they meet the requirements of [A.R.S. § 49-244\(2\)\(b\)](#). Appellants established that the  
existing POC wells are too far from “the limit projected in the horizontal plane of the  
area on which [lixiviant] will be placed,” or PMA, to comply with [A.R.S. § 49-  
244\(2\)\(b\)\(iii\)](#).”).

26 <sup>98</sup> **Record-69**, 2017 Board Order at 4, FOF 19 ([RA007465](#)).

1 source; and (3) they are not more than 750 feet downgradient from the edge of  
2 the PMA.<sup>99</sup>

3 The location of these four POC Wells clearly pose an increased threat to the  
4 Town's drinking water supply because they are too far away to detect escapes of  
5 sulfuric acid mining solution into the drinking water aquifer during the active  
6 life of FCI's pilot test—the whole reason for their existence. In 2014, the Board  
7 held: (1) "substantially less costly POC wells . . . cannot be used as POC wells  
8 unless they meet the requirements of [A.R.S. § 49-244\(2\)\(b\)](#)"; and (2) the four  
9 existing POC wells "are too far from 'the limit projected in the horizontal plane  
10 of the area on which [lixiviant] will be placed' . . . to comply with [A.R.S. § 49-](#)  
11 [244\(2\)\(b\)\(iii\)](#)."<sup>100</sup> No appeal was taken from these findings.

12 The Legislature intended that there be significant justification for  
13 alternative compliance points. They established a high bar, not a rote  
14 administrative "check box" requirement. Here, FCI's purported cost savings  
15 cannot justify these POC Well locations when the POC Wells are so far from the  
16 pilot test well field that they are irrelevant to any reasonable monitoring scheme  
17 and provide no protection to downgradient drinking water supplies.<sup>101</sup>

18 In 2014, the Board found "the evidence submitted at the hearing confirmed  
19 that the permitted locations of the POC Wells do not allow any meaningful  
20 monitoring of pollutants that may escape the PMA during PTF operations." By  
21 allowing these four POC Wells to remain in the very locations that the Board  
22 previously rejected, ADEQ will not trigger a permit violation if contaminants  
23 have escaped FCI's control because those pollutants will not reach these POC

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24 <sup>99</sup> [A.R.S. § 49-244](#).

25 <sup>100</sup> **Record-2**, 2014 Decision at 140, COL 59 ([RA001922](#)).

26 <sup>101</sup> **Record-69**, 2017 Board Order at 4, ¶ 19 ([RA007465](#)).

1 Wells until many years *after* pilot test operations end. Yet somehow in this appeal  
2 the Board found that situation both reasonable and lawful.<sup>102</sup> It is neither, and the  
3 Court should reverse the Board's order and remand to ADEQ with direction that  
4 the POC locations be selected in accordance with the Arizona law and the Board's  
5 2014 binding decision.

6  
7 **E. The Alert Level for Fluid Electrical Conductivity Is Unlawful and Unreasonable.**

8 Electrical conductivity measures the ability of water to conduct electricity,  
9 which in turn is indicative of mineral content. Elevated conductivity resulting  
10 from the high dissolved mineral content in FCI's sulfuric acid solution is easily  
11 measured and is one of the most effective diagnostic indicators of the solution's  
12 presence in groundwater. Frequent and widespread measurement of  
13 conductivity levels, including at varied depths in every Observation and  
14 monitoring well, is a critical component of environmental protection at an in-situ  
15 leach facility.<sup>103</sup>

16 The Board's review of the original Temporary APP found that ADEQ and  
17 FCI had admitted that migration of mining pollutants into the LBFU would  
18 violate the permit;<sup>104</sup> that the Temporary APP lacked any monitoring inside the  
19 PTF well field for vertical migration of mining pollutants;<sup>105</sup> and that existing  
20 monitoring in the Temporary APP would not detect mining pollutants until long  
21 after PTF operations had ended.<sup>106</sup> The Board directed ADEQ on remand to  
22 require "meaningful monitoring," in part through electrical conductivity

23 <sup>102</sup> *Id.* at 10-11, COL 52-56 ([RA007471](#)).

24 <sup>103</sup> *See generally* **Record-2**, 2014 Decision at 70-73, FOF ¶¶ 243-252 ([RA001852-55](#)).

25 <sup>104</sup> *Id.* at 130, COL ¶ 31 ([RA001912](#)).

26 <sup>105</sup> *Id.* at 131, COL ¶ 35 ([RA001913](#)).

<sup>106</sup> *Id.* at 130, COL ¶ 32 ([RA001912](#)).

1 monitoring for vertical migration of mining pollutants into the LBFU.<sup>107</sup> While  
2 ADEQ made several improvements to the permit's monitoring requirements,  
3 significant deficiencies remain that render the Board's decision to uphold the  
4 Fluid Electrical Conductivity Alert Level arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported  
5 by substantial evidence.<sup>108</sup>

### 6 **1. Background**

7 Electrical conductivity monitoring measures the electrical resistance of  
8 groundwater samples. Groundwater containing more minerals, dissolved solid  
9 matter, and other contaminants generally has higher electrical conductivity (and  
10 lower electrical resistance) than "cleaner" water with fewer such constituents.<sup>109</sup>  
11 Some variation in electrical conductivity will be seen in a given well over time  
12 due to variations in the chemical content of groundwater passing through the  
13 well. But the sulfuric acid solutions injected by FCI will have significantly higher  
14 conductivity than background groundwater because the solution contains  
15 significantly higher concentrations of contaminants.<sup>110</sup>

16 The comparison of electrical conductivity in wells before and after injection  
17 is one means of monitoring the flow of the acid solutions and dissolved  
18 contaminants through groundwater. If conductivity in an Observation Well rises  
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21 <sup>107</sup> *Id.* at 130-31, COL ¶¶ 33 and 35-36 ([RA001912-13](#)).

22 <sup>108</sup> **Record-69**, 2017 Board Order at 10, COL 49-50 ([RA007471](#)).

23 <sup>109</sup> An exception may occur for water in which the dominant ions are carbonate or  
bicarbonate, minerals whose presence is not well correlated with conductivity. That  
exception will not occur at FCI's site.

24 <sup>110</sup> **Record-21**, FCI Brief Outlining Changes ADEQ Made, Attachment 1, FCI Significant  
25 Amendment Application, at 1-9 ([RA005828](#)) ("The injected solution has a lower  
26 electrical resistivity than native groundwater, and as the injected solution moves  
through the formation it is anticipated that the conductivity signature of the formation  
will change over time depending on the concentration of injected solution present.").

1 significantly above background, it triggers concerns that contaminants from  
2 FCI's injection have escaped.

### 3 **2. Permit Requirements**

4 The Significant Amendment contains a Fluid Electrical Conductivity Alert  
5 Level for Observation Wells, purportedly to help confirm hydraulic control,<sup>111</sup>  
6 but the Alert Level makes no sense. This Alert Level is triggered by "Observation  
7 Well Conductivity Equal to or Greater than Injection Well Conductivity."<sup>112</sup> This  
8 means the injected solution must reach the Observation Wells essentially  
9 undiluted, which mineral concentrations at strengths equal to or greater than  
10 when injected. The comparison between Observation and Injection Wells is to  
11 be made through "comparison of fluid sample collected from all observation  
12 wells and all injection wells."<sup>113</sup> It is not clear whether the outcome depends on  
13 any one Observation Well exceeding any one Injection Well, or some other  
14 metric. Whatever the case, exceedance of this limit only triggers an Alert Level  
15 and certain contingency actions, not a permit violation.<sup>114</sup>

### 16 **3. The Alert level Is Unreasonable and Arbitrary.**

17 The Fluid Electrical Conductivity Alert Level is nonsensical and  
18 unreasonable, because even a massive escape of mining contaminants would not  
19 violate the Alert Level or require any FCI response. Consider a release where  
20 escaped solution is only diluted 0.1% as it travels through groundwater, so  
21 contamination reaches an Observation Well at 99.9% of full strength injectate.  
22 That would represent a near-total collapse of FCI's hydraulic control scheme and  
23

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24 <sup>111</sup> **Record-1**, Significant Amendment, at 4, § 2.2.4 (RA000004).

25 <sup>112</sup> *Id.* at 54, Table 4.1-8 (RA000054).

26 <sup>113</sup> *Id.*

<sup>114</sup> *Id.* at 19, § 2.6.2.9 (RA000019).

1 would pose a significant threat to drinking water resources. But because  
2 conductivity in the Observation Well would be lower than the Injection Wells,  
3 FCI would not be required to even report the event, much less take action.<sup>115</sup> This  
4 is not an appropriate permit standard for ensuring that FCI maintains hydraulic  
5 control or for protecting the Town's drinking water supply.

6 This standard also assumes that an escape of injectate can reach the  
7 observation wells at full concentration. FCI's geochemical model in support of  
8 this permit did not demonstrate that this was possible.<sup>116</sup> If a full-concentration  
9 escape beyond the recovery wells is possible, then FCI's geochemical model is  
10 invalid (or a critical modeling result was not disclosed in FCI's application). If  
11 such an escape is not possible and FCI's geochemical model is correct, then this  
12 standard is unreasonable and technically indefensible.

#### 14 4. FCI's Justifications for the Alert Level Are Lacking.

15 ADEQ and FCI, citing natural variations in electrical conductivity at the  
16 Observation Wells due to the dynamic nature of groundwater flow, have argued  
17 that "any" increase in Fluid Electrical Conductivity at the Observation Wells is

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18 <sup>115</sup> If FCI's hydraulic control failed completely, at least some of the injected solution will  
19 be neutralized, consumed in dissolving minerals in the ore, and diluted by surrounding  
20 groundwater flows. **Record-39**, Wilson Affidavit, at 8, ¶ 27, ([RA006773](#)), (January 31,  
21 2017); **Record-2**, Exhibit 17 to SWVP comments incorporated by reference, FCI Response  
22 to State Land re Mine Operating Plan, at 4 (March 13, 2014) ([RA005461](#)) ("During PTF  
23 operations, the center well is anticipated to produce 1.80 g/L of recoverable copper,  
which reflects the full strength solution anticipated during commercial operations.  
Recovery wells at the edge of the will field are anticipated to produce solution with 1.35  
g/L of recoverable copper during PTF operations because of dilution from native  
groundwater flowing into the well field.").

24 <sup>116</sup> **Record-21**, FCI Significant Amendment Application, Attach. 4, Exhibit 4-A,  
25 *Geochemical Evaluation to Forecast Composition of Process Solutions for In-Situ Copper*  
26 *Recovery Pilot Test Facility at Florence Copper*, Table 3.1 (Estimated Composition of Pilot  
Test Facility Process Solutions (Daniel Stephens & Assoc., May 13, 2014); *id.* at 1  
([RA006245](#)) ("The values shown in Table 3.1 represent solution compositions that  
may reasonably be expected to occur during pilot test facility operations.").

1 not an acceptable alternative Alert Level. But FCI is required to conduct  
2 background conductivity monitoring before injection begins.<sup>117</sup> With natural  
3 background conductivity levels established in the Observation Wells before  
4 injection, an Alert Level could be based on a statistically significant increase  
5 above background at the Observation Wells, just as ADEQ intends to do for Bulk  
6 Electrical Conductivity.<sup>118</sup> While “any” increase may not be the appropriate  
7 standard for a threshold trigger value, ADEQ and FCI have yet to explain why a  
8 *statistically significant increase* above background levels shouldn’t be the default  
9 Alert Level included in the Significant Amendment.

10 FCI also has argued that this Alert Level was intended “to detect the escape  
11 of full concentration injectate fluid” or as an indicator of a preferential flow path  
12 in the aquifer.<sup>119</sup> But an escape or preferential flow path would be equally in  
13 evidence if conductivity spikes significantly above background levels—it does  
14 not have to exceed conductivity at the Injection Wells. Moreover, as written the  
15 Alert Level appears to be triggered only when all of the samples from all of the  
16 depths in all of the wells show excess conductivity. If the concern really were a  
17 preferential flow path, which often occur at a distinct depth, the trigger should  
18 be based upon any single measurement of excess conductivity. Such a level  
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20 <sup>117</sup> **Record-1**, Significant Amendment, at 12, § 2.5.9 (RA000012). *See also Record-21*, FCI  
21 Significant Amendment Application, at 2-2 (RA006171) (“Once the conductivity probes  
22 are installed, they will be monitored for a period of time to establish the natural  
23 fluctuation of background conductivity values . . . conductivity monitoring will be  
24 conducted to establish background conductivity values, and those values will be  
25 incorporated into a background conductivity model.”).

26 <sup>118</sup> **Record-1**, Significant Amendment, at 12, § 2.5.9 (RA000012) (indicating that the Alert  
Level for Bulk Electrical Conductivity is “reserved” in the Significant Amendment  
pending calculation of an Alert Level based on statistically significant variance from  
background conductivity levels established before injection).

<sup>119</sup> **Record-50**, Responsive Affidavit of Mark Nicholls, R.G., at 4, ¶¶ 10-11 (RA007002)  
(February 14, 2017).



1 would be easily determined based on statistical analysis of data on EC values in  
2 native water, just as FCI is required to do for Bulk Electrical Conductivity.

3 The Fluid Electrical Conductivity Alert Level is unreasonable and  
4 unjustified. The Court should reverse the Board's decision and remand the  
5 Significant Amendment to ADEQ for a revised Alert Level that is legally and  
6 technically defensible.

7 **F. The Board Acted Arbitrarily and Capriciously, Abused its Discretion,  
8 and Made a Decision Unsupported by Substantial Evidence When It  
9 Dismissed Appellants' Procedural Claims Without Presentation of  
10 Evidence or a Hearing.**

11 The United States and Arizona Constitutions require due process of law,  
12 and procedural due process requires fundamental fairness.<sup>120</sup> In administrative  
13 procedures such as this one, procedural due process requires that a party receives  
14 adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an impartial judge.<sup>121</sup> A  
15 decision-maker that shows bias or partiality, such as through prejudgment of a  
16 matter before a proceeding is closed, violates due process.<sup>122</sup> Courts review due  
17 process claims *de novo*.<sup>123</sup>

18 In their Notice of Appeal to the Board, Appellants raised two issues  
19 regarding procedural flaws in ADEQ's review of FCI's application for a  
20 Significant Amendment:

21 T. ADEQ violated [A.R.S. § 49-241](#) and applicable law by failing to  
22 provide proper and accurate information in the public notice of the  
23 Significant Amendment, by failing to properly record, transcribe, and

24 <sup>120</sup> [U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 4](#); [State v. Tyszkiewicz](#), 209 Ariz. 457, 460,  
25 ¶ 13, 104 P.3d 188, 191 (App. 2005).

26 <sup>121</sup> [Mathews v. Eldridge](#), 424 U.S. 319, 333-34 (1976); [Emmett McLoughlin Realty, Inc. v. Pima  
Co.](#), 212 Ariz. 351, 355, ¶ 17, 132 P.3d 290, 294 (App. 2006).

<sup>122</sup> [Havasu Heights Ranch & Dev. Corp. v. Desert Valley Wood Products, Inc.](#), 167 Ariz. 383,  
387, 807 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Ct. App. 1990).

<sup>123</sup> [Carlson v. Ariz. State Pers. Bd.](#), 214 Ariz. 426, 430, ¶ 13, 153 P.3d 1055, 1059 (App.2007).

1 respond to public comments, and by publishing a fact sheet that  
2 contained significant misleading statements.

3 U. ADEQ's permit decision was predetermined long before the public  
4 comment period was opened and ADEQ acted with a closed mind to  
5 public comment, in violation of its due process obligation to provide  
6 a meaningful opportunity for the public to comment before a decision  
7 is made.<sup>124</sup>

8 The Board, in executive session during its first hearing on this matter, determined  
9 that it would limit the hearing to four categories of issues that did not include  
10 these procedural issues.<sup>125</sup> These issues were never briefed to the Board and they  
11 were not addressed at the hearing on the merits.<sup>126</sup> Nevertheless, the Board found  
12 that "Appellants did not establish that the Department's actions were arbitrary,  
13 unreasonable, unlawful, or based upon a technical judgment that was clearly  
14 invalid."<sup>127</sup>

15 The Court should disregard the Board's decision, review these issues *de*  
16 *novvo*, and find that ADEQ violated Arizona law and due process. ADEQ acted  
17 with a closed mind throughout the administrative process, predetermining the  
18 outcome of the Significant Amendment decision. The agency developed a  
19 defensive plan of action and undertook litigious action against Appellants before  
20 public comment on the draft Significant Amendment was even completed. The  
21 agency's predetermination is also evidenced in its action denying members of

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22 <sup>124</sup> **Record-2**, Notice of Appeal, at 11 (RA000069).

23 <sup>125</sup> **Record-18**, Water Quality Appeals Board Meeting Minutes, at 3 (Oct. 13, 2016)  
24 (RA005763).

25 <sup>126</sup> Some of these issues saw limited discussion at a later hearing intended to address the  
26 Board's proposed order in this case. **Record-67**, "WQAB Hearing 4-11-17 Transcript," at  
32-49 (RA007333-7350).

<sup>127</sup> **Record-69**, 2017 Board Order at 12, §E (May 17, 2017) (RA007473). The Board  
seriously misstated the standard for dismissing claims in Arizona, if that is what the  
Board intended. See *Davidson v. All State Materials Co.*, 101 Ariz. 375, 419 P.2d 732 (1966)  
(court should not grant a motion to dismiss unless it appears certain the plaintiff is  
entitled to no relief under any state of facts susceptible of proof under the claim as  
stated).

1 the public their procedural due process rights to meaningfully participate in the  
2 notice and comment period. The agency's failure to preserve formal oral  
3 comments on the record and conduct the hearing as required by law has resulted  
4 in an inadequate administrative record and failure of the agency to adequately  
5 consider and respond to public comment before making its decision.

6 **1. ADEQ Improperly Discouraged or Denied Public Comment on**  
7 **Portions of its Proposed Agency Action.**

8 ADEQ is required by law to provide for and encourage public participation  
9 when taking certain administrative actions such as issuing an agency permit.<sup>128</sup>  
10 The agency must also provide truthful information or advice to local, state or  
11 federal agencies, private persons, and business enterprises on matters within the  
12 scope of the agency.<sup>129</sup> On April 14, 2016, ADEQ published notice of its  
13 preliminary decision to issue the Final Agency Permit, triggering the 30-day  
14 public participation period of its administrative process. ADEQ's notice did not  
15 distinguish or identify the parts of its proposed permit action that it believed  
16 were subject to appeal. A copy of the ALJ or WQAB decision was not attached,  
17 the notice did not even identify the administrative body that had issued the  
18 remand, and there was no explanation or summary of the decision or the process  
19 that resulted in the permit's remand. Moreover, the notice gave the impression  
20 that the permit decision had already been made.

21 Those errors were magnified by ADEQ's mischaracterization of the scope  
22 of issues on appeal. Review of ADEQ's decision on remand includes any issues  
23 that were remanded *and* any issues arising out of modifications that ADEQ made  
24 to the permit, the collateral impacts of such modifications, and issues arising

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25 <sup>128</sup> [A.R.S. § 49-208.](#)

26 <sup>129</sup> [Id. § 49-104\(A\)\(4\).](#)

1 from new facts or from ADEQ's failure to make required modifications.<sup>130</sup> By  
2 claiming that the issues subject to public comment were limited to undefined  
3 permit "sections that were remanded to the department for additional  
4 development," ADEQ unreasonably and illegally suppressed public comment.

5 Appellants raised these and related matters in their public comments on  
6 the draft Significant Amendment.<sup>131</sup> In its response to comments, ADEQ  
7 addressed the unlawful limits it placed on the scope of public participation by  
8 simply stating that it had "followed all public participation requirements for this  
9 Temporary APP under A.A.C. R18-9-219."<sup>132</sup> But this rule does not authorize  
10 ADEQ to limit or exclude public participation in a significant permit revision, as  
11 was done here. The agency acknowledged that the problems existed but brushed  
12 them off as inconsequential.<sup>133</sup> ADEQ's obligations regarding public  
13 participation are not optional.<sup>134</sup> Because ADEQ failed to fulfill its public  
14 participation requirements, the Court should invalidate the Significant  
15 Amendment and require a new public notice and comment period.

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19 <sup>130</sup> See *In re Shell Offshore, Inc.*, 13 E.A.D. 357, 2007 EPA App. LEXIS 37, 2007 WL 3138040,  
20 1 (E.P.A. 2007); *In the Matter of Brooklyn Navy Yard Res. Recovery Facility*, 3 E.A.D. 867,  
1992 EPA App. LEXIS 39, 1992 WL 80946 (E.P.A. 1992).

21 <sup>131</sup> **Record-2**, SWVP Comments on Draft Permit, at 33-36 (May 19, 2016) ([RA000105-108](#)).

22 <sup>132</sup> **Record-24**, ADEQ, Summary and Response to Public Comments; Temporary Aquifer  
Protection Permit P-106360, LFT 61845, 45 (Aug. 4, 2016) ([RA006589](#)).

23 <sup>133</sup> *Id.* at 33-34 ([RA006577-78](#))

24 <sup>134</sup> State law only authorizes ADEQ to deny public participation when it renews a  
25 temporary aquifer protection permit without change or the agency's action falls under  
26 the "other permit amendment" subsection of the applicable rules, neither of which  
apply here. [A.A.C. § R18-9-A211\(D\)](#). The rules for this permit action specifically require  
ADEQ to comply with public participation requirements when issuing any significant  
amendment. [A.A.C. § R18-9-A210\(D\)\(5\)](#).

1                   **2. ADEQ's Failure to Record All Oral Comments at the Public**  
2                   **Hearing and Its Reliance on an Inadequate Transcript Unlawfully**  
3                   **And Unreasonably Undermined Public Participation in the Permit**  
4                   **Process.**

5                   ADEQ is required by law to create a record, either by an agency recording  
6                   device or stenographically, of its public hearings on agency actions. This  
7                   requirement is intended to accurately preserve all oral comments and include  
8                   them in the administrative record.<sup>135</sup> The agency must maintain that record and  
9                   make it available to the public for inspection.<sup>136</sup> Moreover, ADEQ is required by  
10                  law to respond in writing to every comment submitted during the public  
11                  participation period of the administrative action.<sup>137</sup> If an agency elects to offer the  
12                  public a formal opportunity to provide oral comments into the record, then the  
13                  agency must accurately preserve complete copies of each written and oral  
14                  comment submitted into the administrative record in order to meet its duty to  
15                  respond.

16                  In this matter, ADEQ began the May 2016 public hearing on the draft  
17                  Significant Amendment by notifying the attendees that the agency's court  
18                  reporter was not there, but the oral proceeding would move forward  
19                  regardless.<sup>138</sup> The agency later prepared a partial and inaccurate transcript for the  
20                  administrative record that was pieced together from a third-party video recorded  
21                  by party-in-interest FCI.

22                  ADEQ's reliance on that flawed transcript created an incomplete and  
23                  inaccurate administrative record of the public participation process that was  
24                  replete with egregious omissions and errors. For instance, the transcript

25                  <sup>135</sup> [A.A.C. § R18-1-402\(F\)](#).

26                  <sup>136</sup> [Id., at 402\(G\)](#).

<sup>137</sup> [Id. § R18-9-109\(C\)](#).

<sup>138</sup> **Record-24** ADEQ Response to Appellants' Brief re Issues on Appeal, attachment C,  
ADEQ Hearing Transcript, at 3, ([RA006486](#)).

1 misidentifies many of the individuals speaking (e.g., Mason Bolitho as Jason  
2 Blythe,<sup>139</sup> Brad Cole as Brad Pullen,<sup>140</sup> Barbara Sylvester as Marge Sylvester,<sup>141</sup>  
3 and Rick Grinnell as Man).<sup>142</sup> The transcript references well over 500 words,  
4 sentences, or complete statements as “unintelligible,”<sup>143</sup> and the word  
5 “unintelligible” appears in the transcript of comments over 40 of the individuals  
6 who spoke. It is apparent that several instances of “unintelligible” comments  
7 encompass multiple phrases or sentences. Several of the oral comments  
8 submitted during the hearing appear in the transcript in their entirety as  
9 “unintelligible.”<sup>144</sup> In its formal response to comments published with the final  
10 agency action, ADEQ makes no note of these errors and omissions.

11 ADEQ is tasked with safeguarding the public’s rights by constructing an  
12 accurate and complete record during the administrative process. It is improper,  
13 unfair, and self-serving for ADEQ to rely on a substantially flawed third-party  
14 recording when the court recorder “did not show up.”<sup>145</sup> ADEQ cannot just  
15 ignore or short-cut its administrative duties, especially when such actions limit  
16 the public’s rights in the administrative process.<sup>146</sup>

17  
18 <sup>139</sup>**Record-24** at 30, (RA006513).

19 <sup>140</sup> *Id.* at 31-32, (RA006514-15).

20 <sup>141</sup> *Id.* at 33-34, (RA006516-17).

21 <sup>142</sup> *Id.* at 45-46, (RA006528-29).

22 <sup>143</sup> *Id.*

23 <sup>144</sup> Those commenters included: (1) Someone identified only as “Man,” whose testimony  
is transcribed as “Let’s (unintelligible),” **Record-24** ADEQ Hearing Transcript, at 31,  
(RA006514); John Anderson, *id.* at 37, (RA006520); (2) Rick Grinnell, identified as “Man,”  
*id.* at 45, (RA006528); and (3) Norma Henderson, *id.* at 55, (RA006538).

24 <sup>145</sup> **Record-24** ADEQ Response to Appellants’ Brief re Issues on Appeal, attachment C -  
ADEQ Hearing Transcript, at 3, (RA006486).

25 <sup>146</sup> A representative of the Attorney General’s Office told the Board that ADEQ  
26 representatives had taken notes at the public hearing that supported the agency’s  
response to unintelligible comments. **Record-67**, “WQAB Hearing 4-11-17 transcript,”

1                   **3. The State’s Litigation Hold Demands Demonstrate That the State**  
2                   **Viewed Appellants as Adversaries before a Permit Decision Had**  
3                   **Been Made.**

4                   On May 3, 2016, during the public comment period on the draft Significant  
5                   Amendment and before Appellants had submitted any public comments on the  
6                   draft, SWVP and the Town received identical, official letters from the Attorney  
7                   General’s Office on behalf of ADEQ instituting a litigation hold demand. Those  
8                   letters purported to require the preservation of 23 different types of documents  
9                   in 5 different forms related to ADEQ’s issuance of “Florence Copper, Inc. Aquifer  
10                  Protection Permit P-106360, Significant Amendment.”<sup>147</sup>

11                  To the extent that members of the public like Appellants have relevant  
12                  information before a permit decision is made, they are required to submit it  
13                  during the public comment period. If not submitted, information possessed by  
14                  the public cannot be considered by the agency and cannot form the basis for an  
15                  appeal. A member of the public has no legal obligation to disclose evidence into  
16                  the administrative record unless and until it chooses to do so through public  
17                  comments or during the appeals process.<sup>148</sup> Therefore, the State had no basis to  
18                  send the letters to Appellants.

19                  at 42, ([RA007343](#)). He withdrew that statement in a later hearing, so there is no evidence  
20                  that anyone from ADEQ took notes at the public hearing.

21                  <sup>147</sup> Letter from ADEQ (represented by its attorneys Jeffrey Cantrell and Rick Zeise) to  
22                  Russell Yurk and Ronnie Hawks, Jennings, Haug & Cunningham representing SWVP,  
23                  Sending notice of a legal hold for matter of Florence Copper, Inc. Aquifer Protection  
24                  Permit P-106360, Significant Amendment (May 3, 2016); Letter from ADEQ (represented  
25                  by its attorneys Jeffrey Cantrell and Rick Zeise) to Barbara Pashkowski, Gust Rosenfeld  
26                  representing the Town of Florence, Sending notice of a legal hold for matter of Florence  
27                  Copper, Inc. Aquifer Protection Permit P-106360, Significant Amendment (May 3, 2016)  
28                  Copies of ADEQ’s legal hold letters are attached as Appendix 1 and 2 to this Opening  
29                  Brief. The court may take judicial notice of the records of a state agency. See [Jarvis v.](#)  
30                  [State Land Dept](#), 104 Ariz. 527, 530, 456 P.2d 385, 388 (1969), modified on other grounds  
31                  by 106 Ariz. 506, 479 P.2d 169 (1970) and by 113 Ariz. 230, 550 P.2d 227 (1976).

32                  <sup>148</sup> [A.A.C. § R2-17-110](#).

1 The letters sent to SWVP and the Town were copied to two attorneys  
2 representing FCI, but no litigation hold demand was sent to FCI or its counsel.  
3 This despite the fact that FCI previously withheld relevant information regarding  
4 in-situ leach mining at this site that Appellants had to obtain through  
5 subpoena.<sup>149</sup>

6 From these facts, Appellants can only infer that ADEQ saw Appellants as  
7 adversaries even before public comments had been filed on the draft Significant  
8 Amendment, which leads naturally to the inference that ADEQ had already  
9 made up its mind to issue the final permit before the public comment period  
10 ended. There is no other reason for ADEQ to instruct its lawyers to send such a  
11 demand to the Town and SWVP, but not to the permit applicant.

12 In combination, ADEQ's flawed notice of the draft Significant Amendment;  
13 its failure to properly record and respond to public comment given at the public  
14 hearing; and its treatment of Appellants as adversaries even before public  
15 comments were submitted are indicative of a decision-maker that had already  
16 made up its mind to issue this permit as quickly as possible. The Court should  
17 not countenance the State's disregard of statutory requirements and procedural  
18 rights. The Court should reverse the Board's decision and remand the permit  
19 with direction that ADEQ provide for real and meaningful public participation.

## 20 VI. ATTORNEY FEES

21 Appellants request the Court award costs, expenses and attorney fees  
22 pursuant to [A.R.S. §§ 12-341](#) and [12-348](#).

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24  
25 <sup>149</sup> **Record-2**, 2014 Decision at 3, FOF 7; *id.* at 127, COL 24 (RA001785) (subpoenaed  
26 documents were "the kind of evidence upon which reasonable persons would rely in  
serious matters.").



1 **VII. CONCLUSION**

2 In 2014, the Board remanded FCI's original Temporary APP back to ADEQ  
3 to fix fatal flaws identified in Appellants' previous appeal. But with regard to  
4 two of the most vital terms in the permit, the PMA and the location of the Point  
5 of Compliance (POC) Wells, ADEQ ignored the Board's finding that the wells  
6 were too far from FCI's well field to provide meaningful monitoring during the  
7 life of FCI's 2-year pilot test, issuing the Significant Amendment with the POC  
8 Wells in the exact same, or nearly the same locations. ADEQ cannot just ignore  
9 decisions it does not agree with. It chose not to appeal from the 2014 Decision  
10 and so is bound by the Board's finding that the placement of these wells was  
11 "arbitrary, unreasonable, unlawful or based upon a technical judgment that was  
12 clearly invalid." The Significant Amendment also contains a monitoring Alert  
13 Level for Fluid Electrical Conductivity that is nonsensical and fails to protect the  
14 Town's drinking water supply.

15 Despite significant public comments on these and other issues in the draft  
16 permit, ADEQ chose to issue the final Significant Amendment largely  
17 unchanged. From ADEQ's handling of the public comment process and its  
18 attitude toward Appellants, one could infer that ADEQ had made up its mind to  
19 issue the permit regardless of what was said during the comment period, thereby  
20 undermining the whole purpose of public participation in the permit process.

21 In light of the foregoing facts and arguments, the Board's dismissal of  
22 Appellants' appeal was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and  
23 contradictory to substantial evidence. Appellants respectfully request that the  
24 Court

- 25 • reverse the Board's 2017 Decision or remand the Significant  
26 Amendment to ADEQ with direction that it reopen the permit to

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address these issues in compliance with Arizona law and the final, unappealed 2014 Decision;

- award Appellants their attorneys’ fees and costs; and
- grant such other relief as is justified.

DATED this 16th day of July, 2018.

/s/ Barbara U. Rodriguez-Pashkowski  
Barbara U. Rodriguez-Pashkowski  
Gust Rosenfeld, P.L.C.  
Attorneys for the Town of Florence

s/s D Christopher Ward  
D. Christopher Ward  
Attorney for Pulte Home Company, L.L.C.


/s/ James L. Csontos  
Ronnie P. Hawks  
James L. Csontos  
Jennings, Haug & Cunningham, L.L.P.  
Attorneys for Appellant SWVP-GTIS MR, LLC

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3 **APPENDIX**

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A	May 3, 2016 Letter from Jeff Cantrell Re Litigation Hold	p. 61
B	May 3, 2016 Preservation Letter Sent to Gust Rosenfeld	p. 68

**A**



MARK BRNOVICH  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL  
CIVIL LITIGATION DIVISION  
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT SECTION

JEFFREY D. CANTRELL  
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL  
DIRECT PHONE NO. (602) 542-7912  
JEFFREY.CANTRELL@AZAG.GOV

May 3, 2016

Russell R. Yurk  
Ronnie P Hawkes  
Jennings, Haug, & Cunningham, LLP  
2800 N. Central Avenue  
Suite 1800  
Phoenix, Arizona 85004-7800

**Re: PRESERVATION NOTICE: Florence Copper, Inc. Aquifer Protection Permit P-106360, Significant Amendment, Place ID 1579**

Dear Messrs. Yurk and Hawkes:

As you are aware, this Office represents the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality ("ADEQ") in the above-referenced matter. This matter was previously litigated and ADEQ believes that additional litigation for this significant amendment is reasonably anticipated.

This letter serves to provide notice that you and your client take the immediate and necessary steps to institute a *legal hold*<sup>1</sup> and identify, preserve, and not destroy any documents, tangible things, information, data (collectively "Documents") and electronically stored information (ESI) on whatever storage media, device or location, in your clients possession or control (including third parties) that is relevant or potentially relevant to the above referenced matter.

Please instruct your client to retain and not destroy, alter or delete any ESI or Documents in any form, including but not limited to: paper documents, email, electronic documents in all formats, including word processing, spreadsheet, database, presentation graphics, scientific or technical programs, instant messenger, printouts, correspondence, charts, maps, materials, messages, calendars, presentations, meeting notes, other notes, status reports, voicemail messages, texts, and any other electronic or hard copy data wherever stored or located. Locations may include electronic, magnetic, and optical storage media reasonably or not reasonably accessible to your client. Relevant locations include not only those within your client's actual physical possession, but also those within its control including such locations as those located at suppliers, consultants, subsidiaries,

<sup>1</sup> A legal hold is a directive to your client and others to preserve ESI or other information pertaining to the litigation. *Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC*, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y.2003).

Russell R. Yurk  
Ronnie P Hawkes  
May 3, 2016  
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successors, assigns, agents, and law firms. Your client is obligated to preserve potentially relevant evidence from these sources, even if your client does not anticipate producing such ESI. This request also encompasses the metadata associated with ESI, including substantive, system and embedded metadata.<sup>2</sup>

This request includes a request to your client to suspend all document retention or destruction policies, including but not limited to backup, restoration, deletion, destruction, and tape recycling. It is also important that your clients do not pack, compress, purge, or otherwise dispose of ESI files and parts of files unless a true and correct copy of such files is made. This request also encompasses residual or ambient data<sup>3</sup> on storage media and devices such as hard drives, thumb drives, and so on used in your client's or client's agent's computers, which may not be readily available to an ordinary computer user, such as deleted files and file fragments. As you may know, although a user may erase or delete a file, it remains intact on the storage media or device. However, reformatting, defragmenting, or any other use of the storage media can cause the deleted or other ESI to be destroyed. It is imperative that all such activity be stopped because of the critical importance of this ESI to this case.

The types of ESI and Documents that must be preserved, and the potential locations of such data, is outlined in Exhibit 1 attached to this letter. Exhibit 1 is suggestive in scope, not comprehensive. See *Kleiner v. Burns*, No. 00-2160, 2000 WL 1909470 at \*4, (D. Kan. Dec. 22, 2000):

This request encompasses all potentially relevant ESI and Documents maintained at your client's office as well as all ESI and Documents maintained in the homes, shared drives, computers, websites, PDA's, and any other location of your client and its current and former agents, employees, representatives, contractors, and family members. Your client must notify any current or former agent, representative, contractor, attorney, family member, employee, or custodian in possession of

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<sup>2</sup> Metadata, frequently referred to as data about data, is electronically-stored evidence that describes the history, tracking, or management of an electronic document. The Court in *Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div.*, 255 F.R.D. 350, 353-355 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) defined and identified three different types of metadata. 1) Substantive Metadata (application metadata that is created as a function of the application software used to create the document or file and reflects substantive changes made by the user); 2) System Metadata (information created by the user or by the organizations information management system such as author, date, and time of creation or last edit); and, 3) Embedded Metadata (text, numbers, content, data, or other information that is directly or indirectly inputted into a [n]ative [f]ile by a user and which is not typically visible to the user viewing the output display of the native file.). Embedded metadata includes spreadsheet formulas, hidden columns, externally or internally linked files (such as sound files), hyperlinks, references and fields, and database information.

<sup>3</sup> This residual or ambient data generally refers to data that is not generally available to the computer user. It has been defined as follows: Residual data includes (1) data found on media free space; (2) data found in the file slack space; and (3) data within files that have functionally been deleted in that it is not visible using the application with which the file was created, without use of undelete or special data recovery techniques. *Discovery of Digital Information*, American Law Institute, SJ035 ALI-ABA 113, 18 February 2004.

Russell R. Yurk  
Ronnie P Hawkes  
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potentially relevant information to preserve such information to the full extent of your client's obligation to do so, and it must take reasonable steps to secure their compliance.

As you may know, a legal hold is a directive to your client and others to preserve ESI or other information pertaining to the litigation. *Zubulake*, 220 F.R.D. at 218 (“[o]nce a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a litigation hold to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.”); *Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis*, No. 02-6832, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19128, at \*23-24 (D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003) (“[o]nce a party is on notice that files or documents in their possession are relevant to pending litigation, the failure to prevent the destruction of relevant documents crosses the line between negligence and bad faith, even where the documents are destroyed according to a routine document retention policy.”); *Phillips v. Netblue, Inc.*, No. 05-4401, 2007 WL 174459, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2007) (“to preserve means to keep safe from injury, harm, or destruction.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged), at 1794 (1976)); *Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell*, 245 F.R.D. 443, 449 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“organizations have a duty, without being so ordered by a court, to preserve documents that they reasonably anticipate may be discoverable in anticipated litigation.”).

Courts have unequivocally made it clear that all ESI available on storage media and devices, wherever located, is discoverable. The law is clear that data in computerized form is discoverable even if paper hard copies of the information have been produced.” *Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc.*, No. 94-2120, 1995 WL 649934 at \*1, (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995). That court continued “[T]oday it is black letter law that computerized data is discoverable if relevant. *Id.* at \*1; *see also McPeck v. Ashcraft*, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001); *Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co.*, No. 97-2307, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240 (Mass. Super. Jun. 16, 1999); *Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Craig*, 995 F.2d. 1376 (7th Cir. 1993).

Time is of the Essence. It is essential that your client act immediately to preserve this ESI since electronic information on hard drives and other storage media can be changed, overwritten, or obliterated by normal everyday computer use. The simple acts of booting up a computer, opening a file, adding new data onto a hard disk, or running a routine maintenance program on a network can alter or destroy existing data without the user’s knowledge. Should your client’s failure to preserve potentially relevant evidence result in the corruption, destruction, alteration, loss, or delay in the production of evidence to which ADEQ is entitled, such failure would constitute spoliation of evidence and ADEQ will not hesitate to seek appropriate sanctions as this matter proceeds. Please confirm by no later than 16 May 2016 that your client has taken the steps necessary to preserve the evidence outlined in this letter, as well as all other potentially relevant evidence to this matter.

Continuing obligation. Please consider your client under a continuing obligation to preserve ESI relating to the above referenced matter that may come into existence after the date of this letter, or that may exist now or in the future but of which you have no current knowledge.

Finally, the Courts in several recent cases have urged parties to cooperate in the exchange of ESI or face possible sanctions. *William A. Gross Constr. Assocs. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.*, 256 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); *Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co.*, 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008). If you have any questions regarding the above, or if you or your client needs clarification regarding what is

Russell R. Yurk  
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being requested by ADEQ by way of this letter, please contact me. We look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,



Jeffrey D. Cantrell  
Assistant Attorney General



Rick Zeise  
Assistant Attorney General

JDC/cg  
cc: ADEQ  
Brad Glass Gallagher & Kennedy  
Lee Decker, Gallagher & Kennedy  
#5039639.1



# Attachment A

## Locations of ESI

The following non-exhaustive list of locations where ESI is commonly located is provided as an initial guide to identifying and preserving ESI. It is up to your client to accurately and comprehensively locate and preserve all of its ESI.

- Network servers (including email, web, and other servers)
- Desktop, laptop, tablets and smartphones
- Portable electronic storage devices or media (including, but not limited to, CDs, DVDs, diskettes, thumb drives, external hard drives, etc.)
- Remote computers with network connections
- Cloud and application Internet service providers (such as Salesforce.com, Box.com, etc.)
- Phone systems, and phone and Internet service provider records
- Backup storage media (magnetic tapes, USB sticks, etc.)
- Network devices (such as attached hard drives)
- Security systems
- Vehicle computer devices
- Biometric devices
- Printers and copiers
- Fax machines
- Other handheld devices
- Other lawsuits (where responsive ESI and/or paper may be located)
- Archived and legacy data
- Offsite electronic data storage such as cloud providers (including, but not limited to Dropbox.com, Box.com, iCloud, Google Drive, and Microsoft OneDrive)
- Outside consultants and/or contractors
- Outside service providers
- Social media sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, as well as private and professional discussion fora

With respect to electronic information not under the control of your client, additional locations may include, but are not limited to:

- Home computers or other personal electronic devices, including smartphones and tablets
- Personal portable electronic storage devices or media (including, but not limited to, CDs, DVDs, diskettes, thumb drives, and external hard drives)
- Personal "Cloud" storage services (including, but not limited to, Dropbox, iCloud, Google Drive, and Microsoft OneDrive)

With respect to paper documents, additional locations may include, but are not limited to:

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Ronnie P Hawkes  
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- Official files
- Informal files that may be maintained by individual employees
- Files maintained in home offices or by third-party contractors under the custody, control or contract of your agency
- Files stored with off-site providers of storage services, (e.g., Bekins, Iron Mountain, etc.)
- Archived files

**Precautions to preserve ESI**

Due to its format, electronically stored information can easily be deleted, modified or corrupted. Consequently, please immediately identify and modify or suspend features, policies, and practices in your client's information systems and devices that, in routine operation, operate to cause the loss of potentially relevant ESI and Documents, including:

- Purging the contents of email repositories by age, capacity, or other criteria;
- Using data or media wiping, disposal, or erasure or encryption utilities or devices;
- Overwriting, erasing, destroying or discarding backup media;
- Reassigning, reimaging, or disposing of systems, servers, devices, or media;
- Running antivirus or other programs affecting wholesale metadata alteration;
- Releasing or pursuing online storage repositories;
- Using metadata stripper utilities;
- Disabling server or instant messenger logging;
- Executing drive or file defragmentation or compression programs;
- Data destruction and deletion policies and practices, and backup or replacement tape recycling policies that may cause the loss of potentially relevant ESI and Documents;
- Disposing of relevant hardware (including printers, copiers, and laptops), unless an exact replica of the file (a mirror image) is made; and
- Maintaining all other pertinent information and tools needed to access, review, and reconstruct relevant electronic data.

**B**



MARK BRNOVICH  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL  
CIVIL LITIGATION DIVISION  
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT SECTION

JEFFREY D. CANTRELL  
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL  
DIRECT PHONE NO. (602) 542-7912  
JEFFREY.CANTRELL@AZAG.GOV

May 3, 2016

Barbara Pashkowski  
Gust Rosenfeld PLC  
One E. Washington St, Ste. 1600  
Phoenix, AZ 85004-2553

**Re: PRESERVATION NOTICE: Florence Copper, Inc. Aquifer Protection Permit P-106360, Significant Amendment, Place ID 1579**

Dear Ms. Pashkowski:

As you are aware, this Office represents the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality ("ADEQ") in the above-referenced matter. This matter was previously litigated and ADEQ believes that additional litigation for this significant amendment is reasonably anticipated.

This letter serves to provide notice that you and your client take the immediate and necessary steps to institute a *legal hold*<sup>1</sup> and identify, preserve, and not destroy any documents, tangible things, information, data (collectively "Documents") and electronically stored information (ESI) on whatever storage media, device or location, in your clients possession or control (including third parties) that is relevant or potentially relevant to the above referenced matter.

Please instruct your client to retain and not destroy, alter or delete any ESI or Documents in any form, including but not limited to: paper documents, email, electronic documents in all formats, including word processing, spreadsheet, database, presentation graphics, scientific or technical programs, instant messenger, printouts, correspondence, charts, maps, materials, messages, calendars, presentations, meeting notes, other notes, status reports, voicemail messages, texts, and any other electronic or hard copy data wherever stored or located. Locations may include electronic, magnetic, and optical storage media reasonably or not reasonably accessible to your client. Relevant locations include not only those within your client's actual physical possession, but also those within its control including such locations as those located at suppliers, consultants, subsidiaries, successors, assigns, agents, and law firms. Your client is obligated to preserve potentially relevant evidence from these sources, even if your client does not anticipate producing such ESI. This

<sup>1</sup> A legal hold is a directive to your client and others to preserve ESI or other information pertaining to the litigation. *Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC*, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y.2003).

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May 3, 2016  
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request also encompasses the metadata associated with ESI, including substantive, system and embedded metadata.<sup>2</sup>

This request includes a request to your client to suspend all document retention or destruction policies, including but not limited to backup, restoration, deletion, destruction, and tape recycling. It is also important that your clients do not pack, compress, purge, or otherwise dispose of ESI files and parts of files unless a true and correct copy of such files is made. This request also encompasses residual or ambient data<sup>3</sup> on storage media and devices such as hard drives, thumb drives, and so on used in your client's or client's agent's computers, which may not be readily available to an ordinary computer user, such as deleted files and file fragments. As you may know, although a user may erase or delete a file, it remains intact on the storage media or device. However, reformatting, defragmenting, or any other use of the storage media can cause the deleted or other ESI to be destroyed. It is imperative that all such activity be stopped because of the critical importance of this ESI to this case.

The types of ESI and Documents that must be preserved, and the potential locations of such data, is outlined in Exhibit 1 attached to this letter. Exhibit 1 is suggestive in scope, not comprehensive. See *Kleiner v. Burns*, No. 00-2160, 2000 WL 1909470 at \*4, (D. Kan. Dec. 22, 2000):

This request encompasses all potentially relevant ESI and Documents maintained at your client's office as well as all ESI and Documents maintained in the homes, shared drives, computers, websites, PDA's, and any other location of your client and its current and former agents, employees, representatives, contractors, and family members. Your client must notify any current or former agent, representative, contractor, attorney, family member, employee, or custodian in possession of

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<sup>2</sup> Metadata, frequently referred to as data about data, is electronically-stored evidence that describes the history, tracking, or management of an electronic document. The Court in *Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div.*, 255 F.R.D. 350, 353-355 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) defined and identified three different types of metadata. 1) Substantive Metadata (application metadata that is created as a function of the application software used to create the document or file and reflects substantive changes made by the user); 2) System Metadata (information created by the user or by the organizations information management system such as author, date, and time of creation or last edit); and, 3) Embedded Metadata (text, numbers, content, data, or other information that is directly or indirectly inputted into a [n]ative [f]ile by a user and which is not typically visible to the user viewing the output display of the native file.). Embedded metadata includes spreadsheet formulas, hidden columns, externally or internally linked files (such as sound files), hyperlinks, references and fields, and database information.

<sup>3</sup> This residual or ambient data generally refers to data that is not generally available to the computer user. It has been defined as follows: Residual data includes (1) data found on media free space; (2) data found in the file slack space; and (3) data within files that have functionally been deleted in that it is not visible using the application with which the file was created, without use of undelete or special data recovery techniques. *Discovery of Digital Information*, American Law Institute, SJ035 ALI-ABA 113, 18 February 2004.

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
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Barbara Pashkowski  
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being requested by ADEQ by way of this letter, please contact me. We look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,



Jeffrey D. Cantrell  
Assistant Attorney General



Rick Zelse  
Assistant Attorney General

JDC/cg  
cc: ADEQ  
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